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Using First-Order Logic to Reason about Policies
Joseph Y. Halpern and Vicky Weissman
Cornell University
A policy describes the conditions under which an action is permitted or forbidden. We show that
a fragment of (multi-sorted) first-order logic can be used to represent and reason about policies.
Because we use first-order logic, policies have a clear syntax and semantics. We show that further
restricting the fragment results in a language that is still quite expressive yet is also tractable.
More precisely, questions about entailment, such as ‘May Alice access the file?’, can be answered
in time that is a low-order polynomial (indeed, almost linear in some cases), as can questions
about the consistency of policy sets.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.2.7 [Database Management]: Database Administra-
tion—Security ; integrity ; protection; K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Electronic Commerce—
Security
General Terms: Security, Languages
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Digital Rights Management
1. INTRODUCTION
A policy describes the conditions under which an action, such as reading a file, is
permitted or forbidden. Digital-content providers have a rough idea of what their
policies should be. Unfortunately, policies are typically described informally. As a
result, their meaning and consequences are not always clear. To better understand
the problem, consider the statement “only librarians may edit the on-line catalog”.
We can view this statement as a policy because it governs who may edit the catalog,
based on whether the editor is a librarian. It is not clear if this policy permits
librarians to make changes to the catalog or only forbids anyone who is not a
librarian from doing so. The policy could be rewritten to remove this particular
ambiguity, but others are likely to exist if policies are written in a natural language.
Of course, policies do not need to be written in a natural language. Access control
lists (ACLs) [Pfleeger 1997] have been used for decades to capture simple policies
in an unambiguous way. Unfortunately, ACLs lack the expressive power needed
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by many of today’s digital-content providers. For example, we cannot capture the
policy “members are permitted to access the digital library”; the best we can do
using ACLs is to maintain a list that must be updated whenever the set of members
change. Another option is to write policies in an XML-based language. Two popular
choices are XrML (eXtensible rights Markup Language) (XrML) [ContentGuard
2001] and ODRL (Open Digital Rights Language) [Iannella 2001]. These languages
can be given formal semantics (in part because their syntax, unlike that of natural
languages, is quite restricted) and they do have more expressive power than ACLs.
Prior to our work, however, neither language had formal semantics and, as a result,
policies written in these languages were often ambiguous.1
The formal-methods community has proposed a number of languages that have
formal semantics. Perhaps the most popular approach is to base the language
on some extension of Datalog [Garcia-Molina et al. 2002]. These extensions are
tractable fragments of first-order logic that allow a limited use of function symbols
and negation. Unfortunately, the extensions do not seem to have the necessary
expressive power to capture a number of policies that are currently written in
English. For example, in the iTunes Terms of Sale [Apple Computer 2004], certain
actions are explicitly forbidden and others are unregulated; most of the variants of
Datalog cannot distinguish between the two categories.
Our goal in this paper is to provide a better language in which to write policies.
The language must have a clear syntax and semantics. To be of practical interest,
it must also satisfy (at least) the following desiderata.
(1) It must be expressive enough to capture in an easy and natural way the policies
that people want to discuss.
(2) It must be tractable enough to allow interesting queries about policies to be
answered efficiently.
(3) It must be usable by non-experts, because we cannot expect policymakers and
administrators to be well-versed in logic or programming languages.
To achieve our objectives, we use a fragment of first-order logic that we call Lithium.
While our approach is reminiscent of the Datalog ones, the restrictions that we
make are quite different from those made previously. We believe (and will argue
throughout this paper) that the resulting language is especially well-suited for many
applications, and has a number of advantages over variants of Datalog.
Because Lithium is a fragment of first-order logic, it automatically has a clear
syntax and semantics; thus, it remains to argue that the logic satisfies the three goals
listed above. Whether a logic is sufficiently expressive to satisfy the first objective
naturally depends on the application. To evaluate our approach, we gathered a
large collection of policies from different types of libraries, ranging from small public
libraries to the Library of Congress; we then determined that the policies could be
written in Lithium (sometimes considering multiple versions of the policies, one for
1Recently, we have given formal semantics to a representative fragment of XrML [Halpern and
Weissman 2004] and a representative fragment of ODRL [Pucella and Weissman 2004]. Both
semantics are based on the approach given in this paper. The latest specification of XrML [MPEG
2004] includes formal semantics, in part to address our criticisms, but their approach is different
from that used here.
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each interpretation). In addition, we have performed the same analysis on various
parts of US legislation, including substantial fragments of the Privacy Rule, which
governs access to electronic medical files, and Title 42, Chapter 7 of the US Code,
which determines who is eligible for Social Security. Finally, we have shown that
large fragments of XrML and ODRL can be translated into Lithium; see [Halpern
and Weissman 2004; Pucella and Weissman 2004]. Our work indicates that Lithium
is expressive enough to capture many (if not most) policies of interest.
For the second desideratum, we focus on two key queries:
—Given a set of policies and an environment that provides all relevant facts (e.g.,
“Alice is a librarian”, “Anyone who is a librarian for less than a year is a novice”,
etc.), does it follow that a particular action, such as Alice editing the on-line
catalog, is permitted or forbidden?
—Is a set of policies consistent? In other words, are there no actions that are both
permitted and forbidden by the policies in the set? This question is particularly
interesting for collaboration. For example, suppose that Alice is writing the
policies for her university’s new outreach program. If the union of her policies
and the university policies is consistent, then she knows that her policies do not
contradict those of the university.
The answers to these questions could be used by enforcement mechanisms and
individuals who want to do regulated activities. More importantly, we believe that
the answers provide a reasonably good understanding of the policies, increasing our
confidence that the formal statements capture the informal rules and the informal
rules capture the policy creator’s intent.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we formally
define our notions of policy and environment. We also give examples that illustrate
how policies can be represented in an appropriate fragment of first-order logic.
Sections 3 and 4 focus on queries about permissions (that is, whether a specific
action is permitted given an environment and a set of policies); all our results hold
with essentially no change for queries about prohibitions. We show in Section 3
that such queries are, in general, hard to answer. In Section 4, we consider some
restrictions that we believe typically hold in practice; under these restrictions, the
queries are tractable. We address the consistency problem in Section 5. Of course,
we do not expect typical users to be experts in first-order logic. In Section 6,
we discuss what can be done to make Lithium accessible to non-logicians. Related
work, including the Datalog approaches, are discussed in Section 7. Our concluding
remarks are given in Section 8. Most proofs are left to the appendix.
2. A FIRST-ORDER LOGIC FOR REASONING ABOUT POLICIES
For the rest of the paper, we assume knowledge of first-order logic at the level of
Enderton [1972]. More specifically, we assume the reader is familiar with the syn-
tax of first-order logic, including constants, variables, predicate symbols, function
symbols, and quantification; with the semantics of first-order logic, including re-
lational models and valuations; and with the notions of satisfiability and validity
of first-order formulas. Recall that many-sorted first-order logic is first-order logic
modified so that each term is associated with a sort (i.e., type); variables of sort
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s range over the elements of sort s; and the signatures of predicate and function
symbols restrict each argument to elements of a particular sort.
We use many-sorted first-order logic with equality over some vocabulary Φ to
express and reason about policies. Let Lfo(Φ) denote the set of first-order formulas
over the vocabulary Φ. For this paper, we assume that there are at least three
sorts, Actions (e.g., accessing a file), Subjects (the agents that perform actions;
these are sometimes called principals in the literature), and Times . While these
sorts seem natural for any policy logic, other sorts may be desired for particular
applications. These sorts, including objects and roles, may be added to the logic
without affecting our results.
The vocabulary Φ is application-dependent; however, we assume that Φ contains
a constant now of sort Times and a binary predicate Permitted on Subjects ×
Actions . The constant now denotes the current time. In practice, a global clock
would determine the interpretation of now. Permitted(t, t′) means that subject t
is allowed to perform action t′. In practice, it may be useful to add additional argu-
ments to Permitted, such as when the action is permitted and who is authorizing
the granting or revoking of the permission. Which arguments are added (if any) de-
pend on the application and on other choices made in the vocabulary. For example,
consider a policy p that says “Alice is permitted to append image m to file f”. We
could either take Permitted to be a binary predicate and append to be a binary
function, and express p as “Permitted(Alice, append(m, f))”; or we could take
append to be a unary function and Permitted to be a ternary predicate, and
express p as “Permitted(Alice, append(m), f)”. Our results apply regardless of
which choice is made, because they do not depend on the arity of Permitted and
the other functions and predicates in the language. In fact, our results still hold
even if policies refer to different variants of Permitted, with different arities.
A policy is a closed first-order formula of the form
∀x1 . . . ∀xm(f ⇒ (¬)Permitted(t, t
′)),
where f is any first-order formula, t and t′ are terms of sort Subject and Action
respectively, and the notation (¬)Permitted indicates that the Permitted predi-
cate may or may not be negated. Defining a policy in this way provides a structure
that matches our intuition, namely, that a policy is a set of conditions under which
an action is or is not permitted.
To illustrate how policies can be expressed in first-order logic, consider the fol-
lowing examples.
Example 2.1. The policy “only librarians may edit the catalog” can be charac-
terized by the following two formulas:
∀x(¬Librarian(x)⇒ ¬Permitted(x, edit the catalog))
∀x(Librarian(x)⇒ Permitted(x, edit the catalog)).
(Depending on the intended meaning of the English statement, the first formula by
itself may characterize the policy.)
Example 2.2. The policy “a customer may download any article if she has paid
a fee within the past six weeks” can be rewritten as “if an individual i has paid the
fee within the past six weeks, i is a customer, and a is some article, then i may
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download a”. The policy can be encoded readily as
∀i∀t∀a((PaidFee(i, t) ∧ (now− 6 < t < now) ∧Customer(i,now) ∧Article(a))
⇒ Permitted(i,download(a))).
Example 2.3. The policy set “anyone may sing” and “anyone who is allowed
to sing may dance” can be characterized by the following two formulas:
∀x(Permitted(x, sing))
∀x(Permitted(x, sing)⇒ Permitted(x,dance)).
To determine the consequences of policies, we need to know which facts are true in
the environment (i.e., the context in which the policies are applied). For example, if
the environment implies that Alice is a librarian, then the policies in Example 2.1
imply that she may edit the catalog. If the environment is silent as to whether
Alice is a librarian, then the policies in Example 2.1 do not regulate her actions.
The environment may include specific statements such as “Alice is a librarian”,
“The Cat in the Hat is a children’s book”, or “Sally has a junior library card”.
General statements may also be included, such as the conditions under which a
customer is considered to be in good standing and “at all times, there is a senior
staff member who is on call”. All the examples we have considered so far confirm
our belief that first-order logic is sufficiently expressive to capture most environ-
ments that are likely to arise in practice. Thus, we formally define an environment
to be a closed first-order formula that does not contain the Permitted predicate.
The requirement that the environment not contain Permitted encourages the in-
tuitive separation between the environment, which is a description of reality, and
the policies, which are the rules governing that reality.
The two types of queries discussed in the introduction can now be formalized.
The first query, is an individual t permitted to perform an action t′ (where t and t′
are closed terms) given an environment E and some policies p1, . . . , pn, amounts to
asking if the formula E ∧ p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pn ⇒ Permitted(t, t
′) is valid. (Similarly, t is
forbidden to do t′ if and only if E∧p1∧ . . .∧pn ⇒ ¬Permitted(t, t
′) is valid.) The
second query, “Are the policies consistent?”, asks if the formula E ∧ p1 ∧ . . .∧ pn is
satisfiable. For ease of exposition, we focus on determining if an action is permitted
(or forbidden). As we show, it is easy to modify our techniques to handle the
consistency question.
3. INTRACTABILITY RESULTS
In general, the queries in which we are interested cannot be answered efficiently.
Indeed, the problem in its full generality is easily seen to be undecidable if the
vocabulary Φ has at least one binary predicate other than Permitted (and closed
terms t and t′ of sort Subjects and Actions, respectively, so that it is possible
to actually form queries). To see this, let f be an arbitrary formula that does
not contain Permitted. Consider the policy f ⇒ Permitted(t, t′), and let the
environment be empty (i.e., true). Standard manipulations show that
(f ⇒ Permitted(t, t′))⇒ Permitted(t, t′)
is equivalent to
f ∨Permitted(t, t′).
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Since f does not mention Permitted, the last formula is valid iff f is valid. The
validity problem for first-order formulas is well known to be undecidable, even if
we restrict to formulas whose only nonlogical symbol is a binary predicate. In fact,
undecidability holds if we further restrict to formulas that have a single alternation
of quantifiers (i.e., formulas of the form Q1x1 . . .QnxnR1y1 . . . Rmymf , where Qi =
∃ and Rj = ∀ for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,m or vice-versa, and f is quantifier-
free) [Bo¨rger et al. 1997]. So, in general, we cannot determine whether a single
policy implies a permission if writing the policy as a first-order formula requires an
alternation of quantifiers and a binary predicate other than Permitted. In fact,
undecidability holds even without the assumption that Φ has a binary predicate
other than Permitted.
Theorem 3.1. Let L0 be the set of closed formulas of the form
(f ⇒ Permitted(c, c′))⇒ Permitted(c, c′),
where c and c′ are constants of the appropriate sorts, f has a single alternation
of quantifiers, and the only nonlogical symbol in f is Permitted. The validity
question for L0 is undecidable.
Not surprisingly, similar undecidability results hold if we allow formulas in the
environment to involve an alternation of quantifiers (provided that there is a binary
predicate in the language other than Permitted, since we do not allow Permitted
in the environment). Given Theorem 3.1, it seems that our only hope is to forbid
any alternation of quantifiers.
How much quantification do we really need? A quantifier-free environment suf-
fices to capture simple databases. Many applications, however, need a richer en-
vironment that includes general properties, such as “men are not women” and “a
senior citizen is anyone over sixty-five years old”. For these applications, univer-
sal quantification is needed in the environment. In addition, almost all applica-
tions need quantification in their policies. To see why, notice that if we do not
allow a policy to have any quantification (i.e., define a policy to have the form
f ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) where t and t′ are closed terms and f is quantifier-free), then
each policy must govern a specific individual and action. For example, we can say
“If Alice is good, she may play outside”, but we cannot say “All good children
may play outside”. Because policies typically permit an individual to do an action
based on the attributes of that individual, we must allow policies to be universally
quantified.
All policies expressible in XrML and in ODRL, as well as the policies that we
have collected from libraries and government databases, can be written as universal
formulas (i.e., as formulas that can be written in the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xnf , where f
is quantifier-free). Some of the policies that we collected may appear to need exis-
tential quantification, but they can be converted to equivalent universal formulas.
Example 3.2 illustrates how we can apply standard first-order transformations to
do the conversion.
Example 3.2. Consider the policy “anyone who is accompanied by a librarian
may enter the stacks”. A natural way to state this in first-order logic is
∀x1(∃x2(Librarian(x2) ∧Accompanies(x2, x1))⇒ Permitted(x1, enter(stacks))).
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This formula is logically equivalent to
∀x1∀x2((Librarian(x2) ∧Accompanies(x2, x1))⇒ Permitted(x1, enter(stacks))),
which uses only universal quantification.
Note that enter is a function in Example 3.2. Unfortunately, it is well known that
the validity problem for existential formulas with function symbols is undecidable,
even if we restrict to formulas with only two existentials and one unary function
symbol [Bo¨rger et al. 1997]. The following strengthening of Theorem 3.1 is almost
immediate.
Theorem 3.3. Let L1 be the set of closed formulas of the form
∀x1∀x2(f ⇒ Permitted(c, c
′))⇒ Permitted(c, c′),
where c and c′ are constants of the appropriate sort and f is a quantifier-free formula
whose only nonlogical symbols are Permitted and a unary function. The validity
problem for L1 is undecidable.
Theorem 3.3 suggests that even if we drastically reduce quantification, we still
need to disallow functions to get decidability. Once we severely restrict quantifica-
tion and remove functions entirely, then we do get a decidable fragment, but it is
not tractable. Recall that ΠP2 is the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, and
represents languages that can be decided in co-NP with an NP oracle.
Theorem 3.4. Let Φ be a vocabulary that contains Permitted, constants c
and c′ of sorts Subjects and Actions, respectively, and possibly other predicate and
constant symbols (but no function symbols). Assume that there is a bound on the
arity of the predicate symbols in Φ (that is, there exists some N such that all
predicate symbols in Φ have arity at most N). Finally, let L2 be the set of all closed
formulas in Lfo(Φ) of the form E∧p1∧ . . .∧pn ⇒ Permitted(c, c
′) such that E is
a conjunction of quantifier-free and universal formulas and each policy p1, . . . , pn
has the form ∀x1 . . .∀xm(f ⇒ Permitted(t1, t2)), where t1 and t2 are terms of the
appropriate sort and f is quantifier-free.
(a) The validity problem for L2 is in Π
P
2 .
(b) If L3 is the set of formulas in L2 in which every policy’s antecedent is a con-
junction of literals, then the validity problem for L3 is Π
P
2 hard.
(c) If L4 is the set of L2 formulas in which E is quantifier-free, then the validity
problem for L4 is both NP-hard and co-NP hard.
We remark that if we do not require the arity of the predicate symbols in Φ
to be bounded, then we must replace ΠP2 by co-NEXPTIME (co-nondeterministic
exponential time) in parts (a) and (b) [Bo¨rger et al. 1997].
Theorems 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 seem to suggest that the questions we are interested in
are hopelessly intractable. Fortunately, things are not nearly as bad as they seem.
4. IDENTIFYING TRACTABLE SUBLANGUAGES
The work on Datalog and its variants mentioned in the introduction demonstrates
that there are useful, tractable fragments of first-order logic. In this section we
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define Lithium, a fragment of first-order logic characterized by a different set of
restrictions than those considered by the Datalog community, show that these re-
strictions lead to tractability, and argue that they are particularly well-suited to
reasoning about policies.
As a first step towards defining Lithium, we characterize the classes of envi-
ronments and policies that are likely to occur in practice. A basic environment
is an environment that is a conjunction of ground literals. Basic environments
are sufficiently expressive to capture the information in databases and certificates.
While this is adequate for many applications, basic environments cannot repre-
sent general properties such as “every citizen of Germany is a member of the
European Union”. To capture these, we define a standard environment to be
an environment that is a conjunction of ground literals and closed formulas of
the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ℓ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ℓk ⇒ ℓk+1), where ℓ1, . . . , ℓk+1 are literals. Each
conjunct of a standard environment is an environment fact. Note that every ba-
sic environment is a standard environment. A standard policy is a policy of the
form ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ℓ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ℓk ⇒ Permitted(t1, t2)), where ℓ1, . . . , ℓk+1 are liter-
als and both t1 and t2 are terms of the appropriate sort. Standard environments
and standard policies are sufficiently expressive for all of the applications that we
have considered. A simple policy is a standard policy where none of the liter-
als in the antecedent mentions Permitted. For example, Permitted(t1, t2) ⇒
Permitted(t1, t3) is not a simple policy.
A policy base is a formula of the form E ∧ P , where E = E0 ∧ E1 is a standard
environment, E0 is a conjunction of ground literals, E1 is a conjunction of univer-
sally quantified formulas, and P is a conjunction of standard policies. In the rest
of the paper, when we write standard queries, we assume that the formulas E, E0,
E1, and P satisfy these constraints (that is, E is a standard environment of the
form E0 ∧ E1; E0 is a basic environment; and so on). We are interested in charac-
terizing policy bases E∧P for which it is tractable to determine whether the query
E∧P ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is valid, where t and t′ are terms of the appropriate sort.
We call such a query a standard query.
In the next section, we define a set of restrictions on standard queries that guar-
antee that validity can be determined quickly. After presenting the restrictions,
we evaluate the likelihood that the restrictions will hold in practice. In subse-
quent sections, we relax each of the restrictions to accommodate a wider range
of applications without sacrificing tractability. Roughly speaking, Lithium, which
is formally defined in Section 4.2.5, is the set of standard queries that satisfy the
relaxed restrictions.
4.1 A Tractable Sublanguage
We use the following terms to define the initial set of restrictions. A variable v is
constrained in a clause c if v appears as an argument to Permitted in c. For exam-
ple, both x and y are constrained in the clause ∀x∀y∀z(¬R(x, z)∨Permitted(x, y));
z is not constrained. Two literals ℓ and ℓ′ are unifiable if there are variable substitu-
tions σ and σ′ such that ℓσ = ℓ′σ′. For example, R(x, c1) andR(c2, y) are unifiable
by substituting c2 for x and c1 for y, while R(x, c1) and R(y, c2) are not unifiable
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. V, No. N, August 2018.
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(if c1 and c2 are distinct constants). Let f be a formula in CNF
2 and let ℓ be a
literal in f . We say that ℓ is bipolar in f if there is another literal ℓ′ in f such that
ℓ and ¬ℓ′ are unifiable. The pair ℓ, ℓ′ is called a bipolar pair. For example, consider
the formula f = ∀x(Permitted(x,nap)⇒ Permitted(Advisor(x),nap)), which
in CNF is ∀x(¬Permitted(x,nap) ∨ Permitted(Advisor(x),nap)). Because
¬Permitted(x,nap)[x/Advisor(y)] = ¬Permitted(Advisor(x),nap)[x/y], the
literals ¬Permitted(x,nap) and Permitted(Advisor(x),nap) are bipolar in f ;
together they form a bipolar pair.
Theorem 4.1. Let L5 consist of all standard queries of the form E ∧ P ⇒
Permitted(t, t′) such that
(1) E is basic (i.e., E is a conjunction of ground literals),
(2) there are no bipolar literals in P ,
(3) equality is not mentioned in E ∧ P , and
(4) every variable appearing in a conjunct p of P is constrained in p.
The validity of formulas in L5 can be determined in time O((|E|+|P ||Permitted(t, t
′)|) log |E|),
where |ϕ| denotes the length of ϕ, when viewed as a string of symbols.
Note that the language L5 includes formulas such as
Student(Alice) ∧Good(Alice)∧
∀x(Student(x)⇒ Permitted(x,work))∧
∀x(Student(x) ∧Good(x)⇒ Permitted(x,play))⇒ Permitted(Alice,play)
(may Alice play given that Alice is a student, Alice is good, all students may
work, and all good students may play). Unlike Theorem 3.4(c), function symbols
are allowed in Theorem 4.1. Moreover, there is no assumption that the arity of
predicates and functions in the vocabulary is bounded. The price we pay for this
added generality and for cutting the complexity to linear in the number of policies
(which could well be large), linear in the length of the permission being considered
(which is almost certainly small), and not much more than linear in the size of the
database (which we expect to be relatively small, particularly in certificate-passing
systems) is the four restrictions. We now discuss the likelihood that the restrictions
will hold in practice; in subsequent sections we consider how the restrictions can
be relaxed.
As we have already said, basic environments are sufficiently expressive to capture
the facts stored in databases and certificates. They are also sufficiently expressive
for the library applications that we considered and for the policies that can be
written in XrML or ODRL, since both languages assume a minimal environment
containing facts such as the current time, the time of the most recent revocation
polling, and the number of times that a particular subject has done a specific action
(e.g., printing a file). It is true, however, that basic environments are not always
enough. For example, the documents that describe who may collect Social Security
2We say that a first-order formula is in CNF if it has the form c1 ∧ . . . ∧ cn, where each ci has
the form Q1x1 . . . Qmxm(ϕ), each Qj ∈ {∀, ∃}, and ϕ is a (quantifier-free) disjunction of literals,
for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,m. Each ϕ is called a clause. We sometimes identify a universal
formula in CNF with its set of clauses.
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define an aged person to be anyone 65 years old or older, who is a resident of
the U.S., and is either a citizen or an alien residing in the U.S. both legally and
permanently. A basic environment cannot capture this definition.
The second restriction, that there are no bipolar literals in P , is likely to hold
if all the policies are permitting policies (that is, their conclusions have the form
Permitted(t1, t2)) or all are denying policies (that is, their conclusions have the
form ¬Permitted(t1, t2)). To see why, recall that a permitting policy says ‘if the
following conditions hold, then a particular action is permitted’. These conditions
typically include requirements that someone possess one or more credentials, such
as a library card or a driver’s license. It is fairly rare that not having a credential,
such as not having a driver’s license, increases an individual’s rights. Therefore,
we do not expect credentials to correspond to bipolars. Similar arguments may be
made for other types of information.
If the policy set includes a mix of permitting and denying policies, then it seems
less likely that the bipolar restriction will hold. For example, suppose that an
individual may smoke if and only if she is over eighteen years old. We could write
this statement as two policies
p1 = ∀x(GreaterThan(age(x), 18)⇒ Permitted(x, smoke)) and
p2 = ∀x(¬GreaterThan(age(x), 18)⇒ ¬Permitted(x, smoke)).
Note that p1 is a permitting policy, p2 is a denying policy, and every literal in p1∧p2
is bipolar in p1 ∧ p2.
The third restriction, that equality is not used, is satisfied by most of the poli-
cies and environment facts that we collected. However, the restriction is vio-
lated by threshold policies (e.g., “if Alice is blackballed by at least two people,
then she may not join the club”) and by statements that say two distinct names
refer to the same individual (e.g., “Alice Smith = wifeOf(Bob Smith)” and
“number of accesses = 7”).
The last restriction, that every variable appearing in a policy p is constrained
in p, holds if an individual is granted or denied permission based solely on her
attributes and the attributes of the regulated action. Notice that the policies in
Examples 2.1 and 2.3 have this form, but the policies in Examples 2.2 and 3.2 do
not. In particular, whether the policy in Example 3.2 allows x1 to enter the stacks
depends on an attribute of some other individual x2.
Before relaxing the restrictions, we briefly discuss why they are sufficient for
tractability. The first three restrictions allow us to consider each policy individually,
that is, E ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is valid iff E ∧ p⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is valid for
some conjunct p in P .
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that E ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is a standard query
in which E is basic, the equality symbol is not mentioned in E ∧ P , and there are
no bipolars in P . Then E ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is valid iff there is a conjunct p
of P such that E ∧ p⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is valid.
If the last restriction holds, then we can determine quickly whether E ∧ p ⇒
Permitted(t, t′) is valid for some conjunct p of P .
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4.2 Relaxing the Restrictions
In this section, we consider the extent to which we can relax the four restrictions
given in Theorem 4.1, while still maintaining tractability. We consider each of the
restrictions in turn.
4.2.1 Beyond Basic Environments. There is an obvious generalization of Theo-
rem 4.1: we simply remove the first restriction and replace every reference to P with
E1 ∧ P , where E1 is the conjunction of universal statements in E. This results in
three restrictions: there are no bipolar literals in E1∧P , equality is not mentioned in
E1∧P , and every variable appearing in a conjunct c of E1∧P is constrained in c. Un-
fortunately, because Permitted does not appear in the environment, the variable
restriction holds only if the environment has no quantification. In addition, we can
prove that, if there are no bipolar literals in E1∧P , then E∧P ⇒ Permitted(t, t
′)
is valid if and only if E is inconsistent or E0∧P ⇒ Permitted(t, t
′) is valid, where
E0 is the conjunction of ground literals in E. This means that a universal state-
ment in the environment can affect the validity of a query only if it makes the
environment inconsistent. To support interesting universal statements in the envi-
ronment, we must relax the restrictions on bipolar literals and variables, which we
do in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.4, respectively.
4.2.2 Relaxing the Bipolar Restriction. If we allow bipolar literals in E1 ∧ P ,
then a permission might follow from a set of policies without following from any
single policy. In other words, the conclusion of Proposition 4.2 might not hold.
Example 4.3. Consider two policies p1 and p2, where p1 says “Alice may cry
if she is happy” and p2 says “Alice may cry if she is not happy”. Formally,
p1 = Happy(Alice)⇒ Permitted(Alice, cry) and
p2 = ¬Happy(Alice)⇒ Permitted(Alice, cry).
Clearly, p1 ⇒ Permitted(Alice, cry) is not valid, because Alice might not be
happy. Similarly, p2 ⇒ Permitted(Alice, cry) is not valid, because Alice might
be happy. But p1 ∧ p2 ⇒ Permitted(Alice, cry) is valid, because Alice is either
happy, in which case she may cry by p1, or she is not happy, in which case she may
cry by p2. So Alice’s right to cry doesn’t follow from either policy individually, but
follows from both policies together, essentially because p1 ∧ p2 includes the bipolar
pair (Happy(Alice),¬Happy(Alice)).
Example 4.3 shows how we can use bipolar literals to infer a statement, namely
Alice may cry, from two clauses, namely p1 and p2. Resolution [Nerode and
Shore 1997] generalizes the reasoning in this example. To understand how res-
olution works, let c be the clause ∀x1 . . .∀xn(ℓ ⇒ d) and let c
′ be the clause
∀x′1 . . .∀x
′
m(ℓ
′ ⇒ d′), where ℓ and ℓ′ are literals. Suppose that σ and σ′ are variable
substitutions such that ℓσ = ¬ℓ′σ′. It is easy to see that c∧ c′ ⇒ dσ ∨ d′σ′ is valid.
Using standard terminology, we call c and c′ the parents of the resolvent dσ ∨ d′σ′,
and we say that c and c′ resolve on ℓσ to create dσ ∨ d′σ′.3 The closure under
3Actually, the resolvent is created using a particular substitution, called a most general unifier,
which is essentially the substitution that replaces variables with constants only when necessary.
For example, the most general unifier for c = ∀y(¬R(y)⇒ S(y)) and c′ = ∀x(R(f(x))⇒ S(g(x)))
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resolution of a universal formula f , denoted R(f), is the smallest set of clauses that
includes the clauses in f (when f is in CNF) and is closed under resolution, that
is if e is the resolvent of two distinct clauses in R(f), then e is in R(f). Roughly
speaking, the resolvents in R(f) are all the clauses that can be inferred from the
clauses in f .
Our interest in resolution is motivated in part because we can prove that a stan-
dard query q of the form E0∧E1∧P ⇒ Permitted(t, t
′) that does mention equality
is valid iff there is a clause c ∈ R(E1 ∧ P ) such that E0 ∧ c ⇒ Permitted(t, t
′) is
valid. The role of the bipolar restriction in the language L5 is also best understood
in the context of resolution. Part of our approach to guaranteeing tractability in-
volves keeping R(E1 ∧ P ) small. If there are no bipolar literals in E1 ∧ P , then
R(E1 ∧ P ) includes only the conjuncts of E1 and P ; there are no resolvents. We
can also prove that R(E1 ∧ P ) is still fairly small if each conjunct in E ∧ P has at
most one bipolar literal. As a result, we maintain tractability if there is at most
one bipolar literal in each conjunct (see Theorem 4.7). However, if even a single
conjunct of E1 ∧ P has two bipolars, and the other conjuncts have at most one
bipolar each, then R(E1 ∧ P ) can be infinite.
Example 4.4. Suppose we have two policies; the first is “Alice may play” and
the second is “for all individuals x1 and x2, if x1 may play and x2 is x1’s boss, then
x2 may play”. We can write these policies as
p1 = Permitted(Alice,play)
p2 = ∀x1∀x2(Permitted(x1,play) ∧BossOf(x2, x1)⇒ Permitted(x2,play))
It is not hard to see that for any integer n, the closure of p1∧p2 includes the clause
(
∨
i=1,...,n
¬BossOf(xi, xi−1)) ∨ ¬BossOf(x0,Alice) ∨Permitted(xn,play),
which says that if x0 is Alice’s boss, x1 is x0’s boss, . . . , and xn is xn−1’s boss,
then xn may play.
While many policy bases that arise in practice have no more than one bipolar
literal in each clause, we have found two relatively common situations in which this
is not the case. The first is when policies refer to properties that are, intuitively,
defined in the environment. The second is when the policy set includes both per-
mitting and denying policies (that is, the set has policies with Permitted in the
conclusion and policies with ¬Permitted in the conclusion).
To see why the bipolar restriction might be violated in the presence of defini-
tions, consider a video store that has three types of customers: regular, gold, and
platinum. Every adult member is permitted to send queries to the store’s helpdesk,
where adulthood is defined by the state in which the individual resides. In New
York, an individual is an adult if she is over twenty-one years old. In Alaska, an
substitutes f(x) for y, instead of substituting Alice for x and f(Alice) for y. So, the resolvent of
c and c′ is ∀x(S(f(x)) ∨ S(g(x))). (See [Nerode and Shore 1997] for details.)
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individual is an adult if she is over eighteen. Formally,
p1 = ∀x(Adult(x) ∧Member(x)⇒ Permitted(x,query helpdesk))
e1 = ∀x(Over21(x) ∧ InNY(x)⇒ Adult(x))
e2 = ∀x(Over18(x) ∧ InAK(x)⇒ Adult(x))
e3 = ∀x(RegMember(x)⇒Member(x))
e4 = ∀x(GoldMember(x)⇒Member(x))
e5 = ∀x(PlatinumMember(x)⇒Member(x))
Roughly speaking, e1 and e2 define the notion of being an adult, while e3, e4,
and e5 define the notion of being a member. These definitions are used in p1 to
regulate who may send queries to the helpdesk. It is easy to see that p1 has two
bipolar literals in p1 ∧ e1 ∧ . . . ∧ e5, namely Adult(x) and Member(x) Therefore,
the bipolar restriction does not hold in this example. More generally, if a policy p
mentions k terms that are defined in the environment, then p will include k bipolar
literals.
Definitions in this spirit arise frequently in government legislation, including the
Social Security database and the Privacy Rule. Thus, handling definitions is a mat-
ter of practical importance. Perhaps the simplest approach is to rewrite the policy
p1 so as to replace the defined predicates in the antecedent by their definitions. This
will result in an equivalent policy base with no bipolars. The effect of replacing
Adult andMember by their definitions in our example is to replace p1 by the six
policies in PNY ∪ PAK , where
PNY = {∀x(Over21(x) ∧ InNY(x) ∧Pr(x)⇒ Permitted(x,query helpdesk)) :
Pr ∈ {RegMember,GoldMember,PlatinumMember}}
PAK = {∀x(Over18(x) ∧ InAK(x) ∧Pr(x)⇒ Permitted(x,query helpdesk)) :
Pr ∈ {RegMember,GoldMember,PlatinumMember}}
Notice that there are no bipolars in
∧
p∈PNY ∪PAK
p and the policies permit the same
actions as p1 ∧ e1 ∧ . . . ∧ e5.
Our translation illustrates a potential problem with this approach: it can blow
up the size of the policy set. Suppose that a policy p has m bipolar literals and
that literal i is defined using ci clauses. Rewriting would result in replacing policy
p by c1 × · · · × cm policies. Each of the new policies can also be longer than p,
although the total length of each one can be no more than |E1|, where E1 is the
first-order part of the environment. Is this so bad? Examples in the social security
database and in the Privacy Rule suggest that typically m is less than three and i
is less than five, in which case definitions do not significantly reduce the efficiency
of our procedures.
In practice, we can often improve efficiency by removing definitions that are
irrelevant when answering queries in a given environment. Continuing our earlier
example, suppose that E0 is the environment that results from Alice by presenting
certificates that show she is a regular member who is over eighteen and in Alaska
(i.e., E0 = RegMember(Alice) ∧Over18(Alice) ∧ InNY(Alice)). It is easy to
see that we can remove e1, e4, and e5 without changing the set of permissions that
are implied by the policy base. In practice, we believe that this single optimization
will usually result in each ci being one (i.e., every predicate is defined by at most
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one clause), in which case our approach to handling definitions does not increase the
number of policies mentioned in the query. As an aside, this optimization is one of
many that are well-known in the theorem-proving community. We suspect that, by
applying the appropriate optimizations, we can answer queries substantially faster
than is indicated by the worst-case complexity results given in Theorem 4.7.
We next show how we can deal with policy bases that have both permitting and
denying policies. This task would be easy if we could consider only the permitting
policies (ignoring the denying policies) when determining if an action is permitted.
Unfortunately, if we do this, then we might not answer queries correctly.
To see why, consider an environment E that says “Alice is a student” and a policy
set P = {p1, p2, p3}, where p1 says “faculty members may chair committees”, p2
says “students may not chair committees”, and p3 says “anyone who is not a faculty
member may take naps”. We can write these policies as
p1 = ∀x(Faculty(x)⇒ Permitted(x, chair committees)),
p2 = ∀x(Student(x)⇒ ¬Permitted(x, chair committees)),
p3 = ∀x(¬Faculty(x)⇒ Permitted(x, nap)).
Clearly, p1 and p3 are permitting policies and p2 is a denying policy. Because p1
is equivalent to ∀x(¬Permitted(x, chair committees)⇒ ¬Faculty(x)), p1 and p2
together imply that no student is a faculty member. (Intuitively, students cannot
be faculty members, because no one can be both permitted and not permitted
to chair committees.) Because students are not faculty members, Alice, being a
student, is not a faculty member and, by p3, may take a nap. We cannot determine
that Alice may nap if we consider only the permitting policies, because to derive
the permission we need the environment fact that is implied by p1 ∧ p2.
If each fact implied by a permitting and denying policy together were deriv-
able from either the environment or a single policy, then we could separate the
permitting policies from the denying policies. Intuitively, this is because the in-
teraction would not provide any information that was not already known. To
formalize this intuition, note that each implied fact corresponds to a resolvent of
a permitting and denying policy. In the previous example, the implied fact that
students are not faculty members corresponds to the resolvent of p1 and p2, namely
∀x(Faculty(x)⇒ ¬Student(x)). Therefore, if every resolvent of a permitting and
denying policy is already implied by the environment or a single policy, then we
can separate the policies. Continuing our example, we could separate the policies
if the environment said that students were not faculty members. A closer analysis
shows that we need to consider only those resolvents that are created by resolving
on a literal that mentions Permitted.
To formalize all this, we need to discuss permitting and denying policies in a bit
more detail. Note that a policy such as ∀x(Permitted(Alice, a)⇒ Permitted(Bob, a))
is logically equivalent to both a permitting policy and a denying policy. (The deny-
ing policy is ∀x(¬Permitted(Bob, a) ⇒ ¬Permitted(Alice, a)).) We say that a
policy is pure if it is not logically equivalent to both a permitting and a denying
policy. For example, policies that do not mention Permitted in the antecedent
(which is the case for almost all the policies we have collected) are guaranteed to
be pure.
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Theorem 4.5. Suppose that E is a standard environment, P is a conjunction of
pure permitting policies, and D is a conjunction of (not necessarily pure) denying
policies such that, for every resolvent f created by resolving a conjunct of P and a
conjunct of D on a literal that mentions Permitted, either E ⇒ f is valid or q ⇒ f
is valid for some conjunct q of P ∧D. Then, for all terms t and t′ of the appropriate
sort, E ∧P ∧D ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is valid iff E ∧P ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is valid.
We can always add clauses to a policy base to obtain an equivalent policy base
that satisfies the antecedent of Theorem 4.5. Therefore, the key question is not
“how likely are these conditions to hold in practice”, but “how many clauses are
we going to have to add in practice so that these conditions hold”. Example 4.4
shows that we may need to add an infinite number of policies to the set. However, in
practice, policies are often simple. (Recall that a policy p is simple if the antecedent
of p does not mention Permitted.) If every policy in a policy base is simple, then
every resolvent is an environment fact and there is, at most, one resolvent per pair
of permitting and denying policies. So, if the policy base mentions n policies, all
simple, then we can satisfy the antecedent of Theorem 4.5 by adding at most n2
clauses to the environment.
Adding clauses to the environment, however, can have an unfortunate con-
sequence. Suppose that E, P , and D are as defined in Theorem 4.5 and E′
is E extended so that the antecedent of Theorem 4.5 holds. Then the policy
bases E′ ∧ P and E′ ∧ D might violate the bipolar restriction, even if E ∧ P
and E ∧ D do not. To illustrate the problem, recall our earlier example in which
policy p1 says “faculty members may chair committees”, p2 says “students may
not chair committees”, and p3 says “anyone who is not a faculty member may
take a nap”. Consider a policy set that consists of p1, p2, p3, and a policy p4
that says “anyone who is not a student may not enter the student-only website”
(∀x(¬Student(x) ⇒ ¬Permitted(x, enter student site))). To satisfy the con-
ditions of Theorem 4.5, we could add a clause e to the environment that says “stu-
dents are not faculty” (e = ∀x(Students(x) ⇒ ¬Faculty(x)). By Theorem 4.5,
we can now separate the permitting and denying policies. However, determining if
a permission is denied might be an intractable problem because the denying policies
together with e violate the bipolar restriction; e has two bipolar literals in e∧p2∧p4.
In this example, we can avoid the problem by satisfying the antecedent of The-
orem 4.5 in another way. Rather than adding e to the environment, we could replace
p1 by the policy p
′
1 = ∀x(Faculty(x)∧¬Student(x)⇒ Permitted(x, chair committees),
which says that faculty members who are not students may chair committees. Note
that every clause in p′1 ∧ p3 has at most one literal that is bipolar in p
′
1 ∧ p3, and
every clause in p2 ∧ p4 has at most one literal that is bipolar in p2 ∧ p4. So the
antecedent of Theorem 4.5 holds and the resulting policy bases satisfy the bipolar
restriction. We suspect that, in practice, a policy base E ∧ P ∧ D either satisfies
the bipolar restriction or can be converted to an equivalent policy base E′ ∧P ∧D
that satisfies the antecedent of Theorem 4.5 and has the property that both E′ ∧P
and E′∧D satisfy the bipolar restriction. We have not, however, done an extensive
check.
Instead of adding these clauses to the environment automatically, it might be
better to verify the changes with the policy maker. To see why, recall the two
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policies “faculty members may chair committees” and “students may not chair
committees”. We could satisfy the antecedent of Theorem 4.5 by adding the fact
“no student is a faculty member” to the environment. But suppose that there is
(or could one day be) a student who is also a faculty member. Then the policy
maker may want to revise the policies to take this into account, rather than allowing
the environment to (possibly) become inconsistent. In general, we expect that the
additional facts needed to satisfy the antecedent of Theorem 4.5 will be ones that
either the user would agree should have been there all along or are ones that should
not be there and in fact suggest that the policies should be rewritten.
4.2.3 Dealing With the Equality Restriction. To explain how we can relax the
equality restriction, we need two definitions. We say that a standard query q
of the form E0 ∧ E1 ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t, t
′) is equation-free if no conjunct of
E0 ∧E1 ∧P , when written in CNF, has a disjunct of the form t = t
′. (Note that an
equation-free query may mention equality in its antecedent, but only in the scope
of negation when the antecedent is written in CNF. Thus, for example, the query
a 6= b ∧ (c = d ⇒ Permitted(t, t′)) ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is equation-free.) It is
easy to see that Theorem 4.1 applies to equation-free queries; it is only positive
occurrences of = that cause problems.
We can actually go slightly beyond equation-free queries. If F0 is the conjunction
of equality statements in E0, then q is equality-safe provided that E1 ∧ P (when
written in CNF) has no clause with a disjunct of the form t = t′ and it is not the
case that F0 ⇒ t = t
′ is valid, where t and t′ are closed terms that appear in E0 and
either t is a subterm of t′ or both t and t′ mention function symbols. For example, q
is not equality-safe if E0 includes the conjunct c = f(c), the conjunct f(c) = f
′(c′),
or both f(c) = c′ and c′ = f ′(c′) (since these together imply f(c) = f ′(c′)).
Note that the notion of equality-safe is a generalization of equation-free; an
equality-safe query can have some conjuncts in E0 where equality does not ap-
pear in the scope of a negation, as long as not too much can be inferred from
those equality statements. The following proposition shows that we can efficiently
convert an equality-safe query q to an equation-free query q′ such that q is valid
iff q′ is valid. Thus, we can determine the validity of an equality-safe query by
first transforming it to an equation-free query and then applying the techniques
discussed previously.
Proposition 4.6. If q is an equality-safe standard query, then there is a stan-
dard query q′ of the form E′0 ∧E
′
1 ∧ P
′ ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) such that (a) q is valid
iff q′ is valid, (b) q′ is equation-free, and (c) |q′| = O(|q||L′q), where L
′
q is the length
of the longest term in q. Moreover, we can find such a q′ in time O(|q|).
Example B.8 in the appendix illustrates the procedure for converting q to q′, and
shows the problems that arise if we allow queries that are not equality-safe. The
example also shows that the transformation procedure can increase the number of
bipolar literals. Since we need to restrict the number of bipolars for tractability,
our theorems must refer to the number of bipolars after the transformation. We
say that ℓ and ℓ′ are unifiable relative to a set E of equality statements if there are
variable substitutions σ and σ′ such that it follows from E that ℓσ = ℓ′σ′. For ex-
ample, P(a) and P(b) are unifiable relative to a = b, and Permitted(Alice,nap)
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and Permitted(wifeOf(x),nap) are unifiable relative to Alice = wifeOf(Bob).
Similarly, we can talk about a literal ℓ being bipolar in a formula f relative to E.
If every conjunct in E1∧P has at most one literal that is bipolar in E1∧P relative
to the equality statements in E0, then after the transformation each conjunct will
have at most one bipolar literal, which is what we need for tractability.
As we show in Theorem 4.7, we can handle equality-safe formulas. This suffices
to handle the use of equality in all of the library and government policies that we
collected, as well as the uses of equality in XrML and ODRL.
4.2.4 The Effect of Unconstrained Variables. Let q be a standard query of the
form E0 ∧ E1 ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t, t
′) that satisfies the four restrictions of Theo-
rem 4.1 (possibly relaxed as discussed in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3). These restric-
tions essentially guarantee that (a) q is valid if and only if there is a clause c in
R(E1 ∧ P ) such that E0 ∧ c ⇒ Permitted(t, t
′) is valid and (b) R(E1 ∧ P ) is
relatively small. (This is made precise in Section 4.2.5.) The role of the variable
restriction is to ensure that, for each c in R(E1 ∧ P ), we can quickly determine
whether E0 ∧ c ⇒ Permitted(t, t
′) is valid. We now relax the variable restriction
in a way that preserves this property.
Let c be a conjunct of E1 ∧ P . A variable v is constrained in c relative to q if v
appears as an argument to a literal that mentions Permitted, is a disjunct of c,
and is not bipolar in E1∧P relative to the equality statements in E0. For example,
consider the query “may Alice read file A” given that Alice is Ms. Jones, Alice may
copy any file to any destination, and if Ms. Jones may copy a file to a destination,
then she may read that file. We can write this query as
q = (Alice =Ms. Jones) ∧ p1 ∧ p2 ⇒ Permitted(Alice,Read(file A)),
where
p1 = ∀x1∀x2(Permitted(Alice, copySrcDst(x1, x2))), and
p2 = ∀x1∀x2(Permitted(Ms. Jones, copySrcDst(x1, x2))⇒ Permitted(Ms. Jones,Read(x1))).
Note that Permitted(Ms. Jones,Read(x1)) is the only literal in p1 ∧ p2 that is
not bipolar in p1 ∧ p2 relative to Alice =Ms. Jones. It follows that no variable is
constrained in p1 relative to q; x1 is constrained in p2 relative to q; and x2 is not
constrained in p2 relative to q.
If every literal in every conjunct c of E1 ∧ P mentions at most one variable
that is not constrained in c relative to q, then it is not hard to show that every
literal in every clause c′ in R(E1 ∧ P ) mentions at most one variable that is not
constrained in c′. (Recall that a variable is constrained in a clause c, as opposed
to being constrained in c relative to a query, if it appears in c as an argument
to Permitted). It turns out that this property is sufficient to ensure that we can
quickly determine the validity of E0∧c⇒ Permitted(t, t
′) for each c in R(E1∧P ).
It can also be shown that if every conjunct c of E1∧P mentions at most k variables
that are not constrained in c relative to q, then every clause c in R(E1∧P ) mentions
at most 2k variables that are not constrained in c. In this case, it can be shown
that the validity of E0 ∧ c ⇒ Permitted(t, t
′) for a clause c in R(E1 ∧ P ) can
be determined in time exponential in 2k. (All these claims are made precise in
Theorem 4.7.) It follows that if k is less than three, which is likely to be the case
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in practice, then we can remove the variable restriction entirely and still answer
queries in a reasonable period of time.
4.2.5 Putting It All Together. With all this machinery, we can finally define the
fragment of first-order logic that we believe to be appropriate for expressing policies.
Lithium consists of all equality-safe standard queriesE0∧E1∧P ⇒ Permitted(t, t
′)
such that every conjunct in E1 ∧P has at most one literal that is bipolar in E1 ∧P
relative to the equality statements in E0.
We can quickly determine whether a query q is in Lithium. To determine if q is
equality-safe, we create equivalence classes for the terms in E0, which takes linear
time, and then verify that each class has at most one term that is not a constant,
which also takes linear time. To determine if the bipolar restriction holds, we choose
a term from each equivalence class to represent the class (choosing a term that is
not a constant if possible) and replace each term in the query by its representative.
The bipolar restriction holds if each conjunct c of E1 ∧ P has at most one literal
that is bipolar in E1 ∧ P , which we can check in quadratic time.
The discussion in Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3 suggests that queries in Lithium
are tractable. The following theorem makes this precise. We prove the theorem only
for equation-free Lithium queries, but by Proposition 4.6, it applies to equality-safe
queries as well (although the complexity statements would have to be changed to
take into account the possible increase in size when converting from equality-safe
to equation-free queries).
Let Lf be the length of the longest clause in a CNF formula f , and let L
′
f be the
length of the longest term in f .
Theorem 4.7. The validity of an equation-free Lithium query q = E0∧E1∧P ⇒
Permitted(t, t′) with m terms in E0 can be determined in time O((|E0|+ T |E1 ∧
P |2) log |E0|), where T = mLE1∧PL
′
E1∧P
|Permitted(t, t′)| if every literal in every
conjunct c of E1 ∧ P mentions at most one variable that is not constrained in
c relative to q; otherwise, T = m2kLE1∧PL
′
E1∧P
|Permitted(t, t′)|, where every
conjunct c of E1 ∧ P has at most k variables that are not constrained in c relative
to q.
Theorem 4.7 shows that Lithium is tractable. Is it sufficiently expressive? The
bipolar restriction holds in all of the applications that we considered, provided that
definitions and mixed policy sets are handled as described in Section 4.2.2. We be-
lieve that our examples are representative, and that in fact the restriction will hold
in practice. The restriction to equality-safe queries is likely to hold for applications
that do not include a threshold policy; that is, a policy of the form “if k instances
of P hold then subject t1 may do action t
′”. If an application includes threshold
policies, then the restriction is still likely to hold provided that the environment
stores the number of relevant instances of P that hold rather than the instances
themselves. For example, the threshold policy “if two people blackball Alice, then
she may not join the club” can be written in Lithium if the environment stores the
number of people who blackball Alice (e.g., numOfBlackballers = 2), instead of
who blackballs Alice (e.g., Blackballs(Bob,Alice)∧Blackballs(Carol,Alice)).
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5. CONSISTENCY
Recall that a policy set is inconsistent if it both permits and forbids the same action.
By detecting inconsistencies, we can warn policy writers that their policies probably
do not match their intentions. We expect that this ability will be particularly
important if the policy set is large or if it is created and maintained by more than
one person. In addition, we can verify that a policy base P is consistent with a
policy base P ′ by checking that P ∪ P ′ is consistent. For example, suppose that
access to a patient’s medical file is regulated by the hospital’s policies and state
law. If the union of the two policy bases is consistent, then the hospital’s policies
do not contradict state law. (Note that the converse is not necessarily true.)
Clearly, E ∧P is not consistent iff both E ∧P ⇒ Permitted(c, c′) and E ∧P ⇒
¬Permitted(c, c′) are valid, for arbitrary constants c and c′. Thus, if the two
queries are in Lithium, then we can apply our previous techniques to show that we
can efficiently check consistency. However, we can say even more. If the condition
of Theorem 4.5 (or the corresponding condition for determining prohibitions) is
met, then we automatically have consistency, provided that E is consistent.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that E is an environment, P is a conjunction of pure
permitting policies, and D is a conjunction of (not necessarily pure) denying policies
such that the antecedent of Theorem 4.5 holds. Then E ∧ P ∧D is satisfiable iff E
is satisfiable.
Thus, in addition to making it feasible to check the consequences of policies, our
conditions essentially prevent users from writing inconsistent policies. This is a
major benefit of adhering to these restrictions!
6. USABILITY
In this section, we consider ways to make Lithium accessible to people who are
not conversant with first-order logic. The restrictions on bipolars and equality in
Lithium might be difficult to explain to non-logicians, but we suspect that teaching
people to write standard queries can be done quickly, particularly if syntactic sugar
is used to help the medicine do down.
We are currently designing usability tests to verify that computer programmers
can learn to translate English sentences to standard (sugared) queries quickly. The
“sugaring” involves, for example, rewriting “∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ℓ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ℓk ⇒ ℓk+1)” as
“type1 x1; . . . , type1 xn; if ℓ1 and . . . and ℓk then ℓk+1”, where typei is the
sort of variable xi. We are focusing on programmers because, if this community can
read and write queries, then they can build user interfaces for other communities,
along with translators that convert user input to queries. Of course, input entered
through a user interface can also be translated directly to a (non-sugared) standard
query. For example, it should be possible to write a form-based interface that allows
users to enter queries, which can then be translated directly to Lithium. Such a
form-based interface was sketched in the conference version of the paper [Halpern
and Weissman 2003]. We have not pursued it because we feel it is better to write
an interface for programmers.
The key question is how we should explain the bipolar and equality restrictions to
policy writers. One option is to define a fragment of Lithium that is easy to explain
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. V, No. N, August 2018.
20 · J. Halpern and V. Weissman
to non-logicians and fairly expressive. For example, let S be the set of standard
queries in which the environment is basic (a conjunction of Permitted-free liter-
als), the policies are simple (Permitted is not mentioned in the antecedent), and
the antecedents of policies are negation-free. It is easy to see that every query in S is
in Lithium. Another example is Rosetta [Weissman and Lagoze 2004]. Rosetta is a
fragment of (somewhat stilted) English in which queries can be written. All queries
that can be expressed in Rosetta are guaranteed to be convertible to Lithium. Fi-
nally, graphical interfaces can be designed in such a way that every query written
using the interface can be translated to Lithium. We conjecture that the Infor-
mation Rights Management system that is part of Microsoft’s Office, Professional
Edition 2003 [Microsoft 2003] is an example of this approach, although we have
not verified that all policies written through these interfaces satisfy the bipolar and
equality restrictions. In short, we believe that, for many applications, there is a
fragment of Lithium that is both sufficiently expressive and accessible to users with
minimal training. Which fragment is appropriate depends on the capabilities of the
users and the needs of the application.
Another approach is to give policy writers guidelines and tools to help them
write policy bases that satisfy our requirements. For example, we might suggest
that policy writers try to minimize their use of negation, equality, and universal
formulas in the environment. We can provide tools to check if proposed policy
bases are likely to lead to queries that are in Lithium. In practice, we expect policy
writers to define the universal formulas in the environment and the policies (i.e.,
E1 ∧P ); individuals then present certain credentials (i.e., E0) along with a request
(i.e., Permitted(t, t′)). In this setting, we can check if the bipolar restriction and
equality restriction are satisfied by E1 ∧ P and, if so, we can conclude that every
query of the form E0 ∧E1 ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t, t
′) is in Lithium provided that E0
is equality-free. This allows us to identify potential problems at “compile time”
and alert the policy writer, who might then choose to change the policies and
environment to more closely adhere to the guidelines.
Perhaps the simplest solution is to not do anything at all. We believe, and have
argued throughout this paper, that queries in practice are likely to be in Lithium. So
users might not need to understand the restrictions on bipolar literals and equality,
because they will naturally write queries that satisfy our requirements. We can
build a verifier to check that a user’s query is either in Lithium or can be converted
to Lithium using the techniques discussed in Section 4.2.2. If a query is in Lithium,
then the user is assured that her question will be answered efficiently. Otherwise,
the verifier issues a warning. The warning could be ignored since our algorithm for
answering queries might still run efficiently or, since warnings are likely to be rare,
an expert could be consulted.
We expect that all of these strategies will allow naive users to express their queries
in Lithium easily. It is up to the application developers to decide which approach
is best in their setting.
7. RELATED WORK
There has been a great deal of work on policy languages. Since we cannot hope to
review all of the work in only a few pages, we restrict our attention to some of the
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best-known approaches and to those that seem most similar to Lithium.
The classic approach in the Computer Science community is arguably the one
taken by UNIX. Every policy in UNIX can be expressed as a formula of the
form ∀x(R(x, r) ⇒ Permitted(x, act(r))), where R ∈ {User,Group,Other},
act ∈ {read,write, execute}, and r is a constant typically representing a file
or directory. The corresponding environment can be written as a conjunction of
ground literals. It is easy to see that every query in UNIX can be written in Lithium.
However, the UNIX approach to answering a query is somewhat different than that
taken by Lithium. UNIX assumes that every action not explictly permitted is for-
bidden. Thus, with an empty environment (true), the UNIX response to the query
¬Permitted(Alice, read(file f)) would be yes, while the Lithium response would
be no (it does not logically follow from true that Alice is not permitted to edit file
f. We can modify Lithium to give the same answers to queries as UNIX, simply
by saying that the answer to a query of the form ¬Permitted(t, t′) given a policy
base b is yes iff b⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is not acceptably valid; that is, a prohibition
holds if and only if the corresponding permission does not. Since we know how
to determine whether a permission holds, we can determine if a prohibition holds
according to the revised definition. This modified version of Lithium can also cap-
ture the way policies are evaluated using access control lists. We believe that we
can also capture whether a permission follows in SPKI/SDSI [Ellison et al. 1999a;
1999b] from a collection of certificates in Lithium, although we have not checked
the details.
Perhaps the most talked-about policy language in industry today is the XML-
based language XACML [Moses 2005]. Every XACML query can be written as
a standard query in which all policies are simple (the antecedents of policies are
Permitted-free) and the environment is basic (a conjunction of Permitted-free
ground literals). There are two significant differences between XACML and Lithium.
The first is that users of XACML are expected to provide an algorithm for deter-
mining whether a permission is granted, denied, or unregulated by a policy base,
as a function of whether the permission is granted, denied, or unregulated by the
individual polices in that policy base. For example, the deny-overrides algorithm
(which is one of the built-in algorithms provided by XACML) says a permission is
denied if it is denied by any single policy, is permitted if it is not denied by any sin-
gle policy and is permitted by at least one, and is unregulated otherwise. Lithium
essentially allows only one algorithm, which is logical consequence (a choice which
cannot in fact be expressed in XACML, since it may depend on the interaction be-
tween the policies in a policy base). We could, of course, modify the way Lithium
handles queries to match any particular algorithm, although doing this may result
in losing many of the unique features of Lithium.
The second key difference between XACML and Lithium is the treatment of
negation. In XACML, the semantics of negation is somewhat nonstandard. For
example, in XACML, the policies “if Alice is good, then she may play” and “if
Alice is not good, then she may play” together do not necessarily imply that Alice
may play. The policies imply the permission only if the environment says either that
Alice is good or that she is not good. So, given a set of XACML policies, we can
replace every literal of the form ¬R(t1, . . . , tn) by NotR(t1, . . . , tn), where NotR
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. V, No. N, August 2018.
22 · J. Halpern and V. Weissman
is a fresh predicate symbol, without changing the meaning of the policies. Thus,
although XACML seems to allow the unrestricted use of negation, it is actually
less expressive than Lithium in its use of negation. Moreover, we believe that the
nonstandard usage of negation may well confuse users.
Another XML-based language that has received widespread support in industry
is XrML [ContentGuard 2001]. XrML and Lithium are incomparable in expressive
power. XrML is less expressive in that it does not allow negation. This means
in particular that it cannot express denying policies and cannot capture a policy
that grants a permission based on whether a condition does not hold. In addition,
the conclusion of every environment fact that is not a ground literal is of the form
R(p), where R is a unary predicate symbol and p is a principal. On the other hand,
XrML is more expressive than Lithium in that a policy can grant a permission
based on the answers to various queries. For example, in XrML, Alice’s babysitter
can write the policy “Alice is permitted to do some action a if the permission
follows from her mother’s policies and from her father’s policies”. We can extend
Lithium to include such policies as well. Let Lithium+ be Lithium extended with
a Val operator, where Val(ϕ) is true if ϕ is valid. We can write the babysitter’s
policy in Lithium+ as ∀x(Val(EM ∧PM ⇒ Permitted(Alice, x))∧Val(ED ∧PD ⇒
Permitted(Alice, x))⇒ Permitted(Alice, x)), where EM ∧PM and ED∧PD are
the policy bases of Alice’s mother and father respectively. We can place restrictions
on Lithium+ similar in spirit to those on Lithium to ensure that it is tractable, yet
expressive enough to capture the policies that users want in practice; see [Halpern
and Weissman 2004] for details.
The policy languages that are perhaps closest in spirit to Lithium are the ap-
proaches that are based on some variant of Datalog. Examples of such languages
include Delegation Logic [Li et al. 2003], the RT (Role-based Trust-management)
framework [Li et al. 2002], Binder [DeTreville 2002], SD3 [Jim 2001], FAF (Flex-
ible Authorization Framework) [Jajodia et al. 2001], and Cassandra [Becker and
Sewell 2004]). Datalog is an efficient well-understood reasoning engine that is re-
stricted to function-free negation-free Horn clauses; these restrictions are made to
ensure tractability. The variants, such as safe stratified Datalog [Garcia-Molina
et al. 2002] or Datalog with constraints , allow limited use of functions and negation
while preserving tractability.
The main difference between Lithium and these Datalog-based languages is in
the use of functions and negation. There are relatively few policy languages that
include functions symbols, but those that do (e.g. [Bertino et al. 1998; Li and
Mitchell 2003; Becker and Sewell 2004]) seem to favor Datalog with constraints. By
using this variant of Datalog, many structured resources, such as directories, can be
expressed using functions. However, function symbols may not appear in intentional
predicates (predicates whose relations are computed by applying Datalog rules, as
opposed to being stored in a database). For example, the policy “every authorized
individual may copy a classified file from one secure server to another” when written
as
∀x1 . . . ∀x4(Auth(x1) ∧Classified(x2) ∧ Secure Server(x3) ∧ Secure Server(x4)
⇒ Permitted(x1, copySrcDst(x2, x3, x4)))
is not in Datalog with constraints. Also, for tractability, additional restrictions
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are often made. For example, Li and Mitchell [2003] do not allow formulas in
constraints to have more than one variable and Becker and Sewell [2004] require
that every argument of a function in a query be variable-free.
There are a number of policy languages that allow a limited use of negation.
Jajodia, Samarati, Sapino, and Subrahmanian [2001] base their policy language
on Datalog with negation, which is a variant of Datalog that allows unrestricted
use of negation in the body of rules. Datalog with negation is tractable because
it makes the closed-world assumption: if we cannot prove that a positive literal is
true, we take it to be false. Unfortunately, the closed-world assumption can lead to
unintuitive (and probably unintended) results. For example, consider the policy “if
Alice does not have bad credit, then she may apply for a loan”, and suppose that
the reasoning engine determines whether an individual has bad credit by reviewing
her credit report. If Alice has bad credit and does not present her credit report,
then a reasoning engine that makes the closed-world assumption will incorrectly
assume that Alice does not have bad credit and thus will allow her to make a loan
application.
Several policy languages (e.g. [DeTreville 2002; Li et al. 2003; Li et al. 2002;
Jim 2001]) are based on safe stratified Datalog. Safe stratified Datalog allows
some use of negation in the body of rules and does not make the closed world
assumption. However, the restrictions on negation still prevent it from capturing
some permitting policies of interest. For example, the policy
∀x(¬BadCredit(x)⇒ Permitted(x, apply for loan))
(anyone without bad credit may apply for a loan) cannot be expressed. More
importantly, denying policies cannot be expressed in safe stratified Datalog because
the language does not allow negation in the conclusion of rules.
This limitation may not seem to be particularly troublesome. After all, the
standard approach is to assume that every permission not explicitly granted is
denied. (For example, this is done in relational databases [Griffiths and Wade
1976], almost all of the Datalog-based languages, UNIX, SPKI/SDSI [Rivest and
Lampson 1996; Ellison et al. 1999a; 1999b], and KeyNote [Blaze et al. 1996].)
However, in many contexts, it is difficult to believe that policymakers really want
to forbid every action that they do not explicitly permit, so there is a mismatch
between a policymaker’s intentions and the interpretation of the policy base. This
becomes a problem when different policymakers want to compare policy bases or
combine them. The following examples illustrate the concern.
Example 7.1. Suppose that a hospital wants to verify that its policies comply
with federal regulations; that is, the hospital wants to check that, if the government
permits an action, then the hospital permits it and, if the government forbids an
action, then the hospital forbids it. If the policies are written in a language that
captures only permissions, assuming all other actions are forbidden, then compli-
ancy checking is essentially impossible. In particular, if the hospital permits any
action that is not regulated by the government (e.g., nurses may park in Lot A, all
staff are welcome to drink the coffee in the lounge), then the hospital will appear
to be non-compliant because it permits an action that is not explicitly permitted
by the government and, thus, is implicitly forbidden. In short, because we cannot
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distinguish forbidden actions from unregulated ones, compliance checking reduces to
determining whether one policy set is essentially identical to another.
Example 7.2. Consider a group of libraries that want to merge their policies so
that patrons are governed by the same regulations, regardless of which library they
visit. When merging the policy sets, we clearly want to detect conflicts (e.g. one
library lets minors check out adult books and another does not). Unfortunately, if
a language can state only what is permitted, then this will be impossible. If we put
the permitting policies from each library into one large set, then that set will be
consistent (it is satisfied in the model that permits everything), regardless of which
policies are in the set. Alternatively, we could require that no library permits an
action that another forbids (which is what we want to do) under the assumption that
every unregulated action is forbidden. It is not hard to see that this approach will
always detect a conflict between sets of library policies unless the sets are essentially
identical.
The issues involved with comparing and merging policy bases have by and large
been ignored, but we believe they will become increasingly significant. It seems
unlikely that a policy language will be able to support these features unless the
language can express both permitting and denying policies.
Although we do not know of a Datalog variant that allows negation in the conclu-
sions of rules (thereby allowing denying policies), some languages seem to capture
something comparable. For example, in FAF, actions are either positive or negative;
the statement “principal p can do negative action act” means p is forbidden to do
act . Another option in the same spirit is to have the predicate symbol Forbidden
in the language, in addition to Permitted. A consequence of this approach is that
it is not logically inconsistent for an action to be both permitted and forbidden.
(Note that this is also the case for XACML, due to its nonstandard interpretation
of negation.) To handle inconsistencies, FAF expects the policy writer to create
overriding policies such as “if an action is both permitted and forbidden, then it
is forbidden”. If an inconsistency is detected when answering a query, then the
overriding policy is applied. Similar approaches are taken by Chomicki et al. [2000]
and Ioannides and Selis [1992]. The main problem with capturing prohibitions in
this way is that the answers to queries might not match a policy writer’s expec-
tations. Policy writers typically do not intend to write policies that both permit
and forbid the same action. Rather than identifying such policies and alerting the
policy writer, potential errors are patched with overriding policies. In addition,
these overriding policies are required even for consistent policy bases, which seems
rather burdensome.
Lithium deals with this issue in what is arguably a better way. Given a policy
base written in Lithium, we can detect conflicts and determine why they occur at
“compile time” rather than at “run time”, when a particular query is evaluated.
Using this information, the policy writer can modify the environment and policies
to more closely match her intentions. Moreover, if the antecedent of Theorem 5.1
holds, then the policy base is inconsistent if and only if the environment alone is
inconsistent. Thus, we can often determine when there is no conflict that needs to
be addressed.
The use of function symbols and negation is not the only difference between
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Lithium and other policy languages. Unlike Lithium, many languages have explicit
support for groups and roles. A group is a set of subjects such that if a group
has a property, then every member of the group has the property (cf. [Abadi et al.
1993; Jajodia et al. 2001]). In role-based access control models [Ferraiolo et al.
1999; Hitchens and Varadharajan 2001; Li et al. 2002; Sandhu et al. 1996] roles are
an intermediary between individuals and rights. More specifically, an individual
obtains a right by assuming a role that is associated with that right. For example,
Alice may need to assume the role of Department Chair in order to obtain the
budget.
Predicate symbols can be used to capture groups and roles in first-order logic.
For example, if we want to say that Alice is a member of the faculty and any faculty
member may chair committees, then we can represent the group using the predicate
Faculty. The environment fact is encoded as Faculty(Alice); the policy is then
∀x(Faculty(x)⇒ Permitted(x, chair committees)).
Similarly, the policy “Alice, acting as the Department Chair, may sign the budget”
can be written as
Dept Chair(Alice)⇒ Permitted(Alice, sign the budget).
The fact Dept Chair(Alice) would be added to the environment when Alice as-
sumes the role and would be removed when she relinquishes it. Alternatively, we
could add a sort Roles to our logic along with the predicate As (as suggested by
Lampson, Abadi, Burrows, and Wobber [1992]), where As(e, r) means that entity e
is acting as role r (in other words, e has assumed role r). Continuing our example,
“Alice, acting as the Department Chair, may sign the budget” could be written
in the logic as As(Alice,Dept Chair) ⇒ Permitted(Alice, sign the budget).
The second encoding for roles may be more in keeping with the spirit of the role-
based model, but we believe that both approaches are reasonable (and our results
apply to both choices). In short, Lithium supports groups and roles implicitly.
Lithium, as well as the Datalog variants, all use a fragment of first-order logic
to express policies. Other approaches use a modal logic. Formal work on deontic
logic (the logic of “obligation” and “permission”) goes back to von Wright [1951].
Glasgow, MacEwen, Panangaden [1992] were the first to base a formal logic of
security on deontic logic. The logic of access control consider by Lampson et al. and
Abadi et al. [Lampson et al. 1992; Abadi et al. 1993] can also be viewed as a modal
logic, with a says operator. These approaches can be translated into first-order
logic, but they have features that take them beyond Lithium. For example, Abadi
et al. have a calculus of principals; Glasgow, McEwen, and Panangaden deal with
obligation as well as permission. We believe that many of these features could be
added to Lithium, but we have not explored this issue.
The KeyNote system [Blaze et al. 1998], which is based on PolicyMaker [Blaze
et al. 1996], is more flexible than Lithium in that the application can invoke policies
written in a number of different languages. These are programs that determine if
a policy applies to a request and a requestor. Because KeyNote essentially views
these programs as black boxes, it is quite limited in its ability to reason about
policies. As discussed by Blaze, Feigenbaum, and Strauss [1998], the system needs
to put restrictions on the programs to ensure correct analysis. This is in fact done
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in KeyNote, but at the price of a substantial reduction in the expressive power of
the language.
Finally, we remark that the design of Lithium was heavily influenced by the
work of Halpern, van der Meyden, and Schneider [1999]. They identify some key
issues that must be addressed when developing a policy language, evaluate various
solutions that have been proposed in the literature, and recommend directions for
future research. Our design incorporates three of their suggestions. In particular,
we write policies in first-order logic; define sorts for principals, actions, and time;
and use a Permitted predicate that takes an individual and an action argument.
(This usage of Permitted is much in the spirit of how it is used in modal deontic
logic.)
8. CONCLUSION
We have presented a fragment of first-order logic called Lithium that seems well-
suited to reasoning about policies. Unlike previous approaches, Lithium allows
nearly unrestricted use of function symbols while still preserving tractability. More-
over, Lithium can express prohibitions explicitly, making it possible to capture the
merger of policies.
To be of practical use, a policy language must be accessible to non-experts with
minimal training and it must be sufficiently expressive to capture the policies of
real applications. To make Lithium more accessible, we have created a front end
for it called Rosetta [Weissman and Lagoze 2004], and are currently designing ap-
propriate usability tests. Whether a language is sufficiently expressive is obviously
an empirical question: it depends on what people want to write. We have collected
numerous policies and verified that they are all expressible in Lithium. Although
this is certainly not a proof of anything, it does increase our confidence in the
adequacy of Lithium’s expressive power.
In future work, we would like to extend Lithium to reason about policies that
change over time. We are also exploring whether a hybrid of Lithium and a Datalog-
based fragment can allow a further increase of expressive power without sacrificing
tractability.
Appendix
A. PROOFS FOR SECTION 3
The following lemma is the key to proving Theorems 3.1 and 3.3.
Lemma A.1. Let L′0 be a set of closed formulas with no constant symbols whose
only predicate symbol is Permitted. Let L′′0 be the set of closed formulas of the
form
(f ⇒ Permitted(c, c′))⇒ Permitted(c, c′),
where c and c′ are constants of the appropriate sorts and f ∈ L′0. If the validity
problem for L′0 is undecidable, then the validity problem for L
′′
0 is undecidable.
Proof. We reduce the validity problem for L′0 to the validity problem for L
′′
0 .
Straightforwardmanipulations show that (f ⇒ Permitted(c, c′))⇒ Permitted(c, c′)
is equivalent to f ∨Permitted(c, c′). Clearly, if f ∨Permitted(c, c′) is not valid,
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then f is not valid. Suppose that f ∨ Permitted(c, c′) is valid. Since f does not
mention a constant symbol, c and c′ do not appear in f , so f∨∀x∀yPermitted(x, y)
is valid. It follows that f is valid iff f is true in all models m that satisfy
∀x∀yPermitted(x, y). To determine whether f is true in m, let f ′ be the re-
sult of replacing all occurrences of Permitted(x, y) by true. Clearly f is true in
m iff f ′ is true in m. Since f ′ has no nonlogical symbols, f ′ is true in m iff f ′ is
valid. Moreover, the validity of f ′ is easy to determine.
Theorem 3.1. Let L0 be the set of closed formulas of the form
(f ⇒ Permitted(c, c′))⇒ Permitted(c, c′),
where c and c′ are constants of the appropriate sorts, f has a single alternation
of quantifiers, and the only nonlogical symbol in f is Permitted. The validity
question for L0 is undecidable.
Proof. Let LA0 be the set of closed formulas that have a single alternation of
quantifiers and whose only nonlogical symbol is Permitted. The proof follows
from Lemma A.1, where we take L′0 to be L
A
0 , because the validity problem for L
A
0
is undecidable [Bo¨rger et al. 1997].
Theorem 3.3. Let L1 be the set of closed formulas of the form
∀x1∀x2(f ⇒ Permitted(c, c
′))⇒ Permitted(c, c′),
where c and c′ are constants of the appropriate sort and f is a quantifier-free formula
whose only nonlogical symbols are Permitted and a unary function. The validity
problem for L1 is undecidable.
Proof. Let LA1 be the set of closed formulas of the form ∃x1∃x2f , where f is a
quantifier-free formula whose only nonlogical symbols are Permitted and a unary
function. Because the validity problem for LA1 is undecidable [Bo¨rger et al. 1997],
it follows from Lemma A.1 that the validity problem for the set of formulas of the
form
(∃x1∃x2f ⇒ Permitted(c, c
′))⇒ Permitted(c, c′) (1)
is undecidable. Standard manipulations show that a formula of the form (1) is
equivalent to
∀x1∀x2(f ⇒ Permitted(c, c
′))⇒ Permitted(c, c′).
It follows that the validity problem for L1 is undecidable.
Theorem 3.4. Let Φ be a vocabulary that contains Permitted, constants c
and c′ of sorts Subjects and Actions, respectively, and possibly other predicate and
constant symbols (but no function symbols). Assume that there is a bound on the
arity of the predicate symbols in Φ (that is, there exists some N such that all
predicate symbols in Φ have arity at most N). Finally, let L2 be the set of all closed
formulas in Lfo(Φ) of the form E∧p1∧ . . .∧pn ⇒ Permitted(c, c
′) such that E is
a conjunction of quantifier-free and universal formulas and each policy p1, . . . , pn
has the form ∀x1 . . .∀xm(f ⇒ Permitted(t1, t2)), where t1 and t2 are terms of the
appropriate sort and f is quantifier-free.
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(a) The validity problem for L2 is in Π
P
2 .
(b) If L3 is the set of formulas in L2 in which every policy’s antecedent is a con-
junction of literals, then the validity problem for L3 is Π
P
2 hard.
(c) If L4 is the set of L2 formulas in which E is quantifier-free, then the validity
problem for L4 is both NP-hard and co-NP hard.
Proof. For part (a), straightforward manipulations show that each formula h
in L2 is equivalent to a closed formula of the form g = ∃x1 . . . ∃xkg
′, where g′ is
a quantifier-free formula in Lfo(Φ). Moreover, |g| is polynomial in |h|. Suppose
that g mentions n distinct constant symbols. Let M be the class of models whose
domain size is at most max(n, 1). We claim that (1) g is valid iff it is true in every
model inM, and (2) the problem of determining if g is true in every model m ∈M
is in ΠP2 .
For part (1), the “only if” direction is trivial. To prove the “if” direction, suppose
by way of contradiction that g is true in every model in M and g is not true in a
modelm with domainD and interpretation I. LetD′ = {I(c) | c is a constant in g}
if g mentions at least one constant, and D′ = {d} for some fixed element d ∈ D if g
does not mention any constants. Let I ′ be the interpretation such that I ′(c) = I(c)
if I(c) ∈ D′, I ′(c) = d′ for some fixed d ∈ D′ if I(c) /∈ D′, and I ′(R) = D′k∩I(R) for
each k-ary predicateR in Φ. Letm′ be the model with domainD′ and interpretation
I ′. Notice that m′ is in M. By assumption, m′ satisfies g, so there are domain
elements d1, . . . , dk in D
′ such that by interpreting xi as di for i = 1, . . . , k, m
′
satisfies g′. Under the same interpretation of x1, . . . , xk, m satisfies g
′. Therefore
m satisfies g, and we have the desired contradiction.
For part (2), first note that g is true in all models in M iff it is true in all
models with domain {1, . . . ,m} for each m ≤ max(n, 1), since every model in M
is isomorphic to one with domain {1, . . . ,m} for m ≤ max(n, 1). The truth of g in
such a model depends only on the the interpretation of the constant and predicate
symbols that actually appear in g. Let a restricted interpretation be one that
interprets only the symbols that appear in g. Because there are mk interpretations
of a k-ary predicate, and the arity of predicates in g is bounded in a domain of
size m, the number of restricted interpretations is polynomial in |g|. It clearly can
be determined in time polynomial in |g| if the formula g′ is true under a given
restricted interpretation in a model with domain {1, . . . ,m}. Thus, determining if
g is true in such a model is in NP (since it involves guessing an interpretation of
x1, . . . , xk). It follows that the problem of determining if g is true in every model
of M is in ΠP2 .
For part (b), let QBF2 consist of all Quantified Boolean Formulas (QBFs) of the
form
∀Q1 . . . ∀Qm∃P1 . . . ∃Pnϕ,
where ϕ is quantifier-free. It is well known that the problem of checking whether a
formula in QBF2 is true is Π
P
2 -complete [Stockmeyer 1977]. We now show how to
reduce this problem to the validity problem for L2.
Let q = ∀Q1 . . . ∀Qm∃P1 . . . ∃Pnϕ be an arbitrary formula in QBF2. Let ϕ
′ be ϕ
with Qj replaced by the ground literal Qj(c) and Pk replaced by the literal Pk(xk),
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. V, No. N, August 2018.
Using First-Order Logic to Reason about Policies · 29
for j = 1, . . . ,m and k = 1, . . . , n. It is not hard to see that q is true iff
q′ = P1(c) ∧ . . . ∧ Pn(c) ∧ ¬P1(c
′) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Pn(c
′)⇒ ∃x1 . . . ∃xnϕ
′
is valid. This follows from two observations. First, note that q is true iff, for
every assignment of values to Q1, . . . , Qm, there is an assignment of truth values
to P1, . . . , Pn such that ϕ is true. Second, q
′ is valid iff, for every interpretation of
Q1(c), . . . , Qm(c), there is an assignment of domain elements to x1, . . . , xn such that
ϕ′ is true. The antecedent P1(c)∧ . . .∧Pn(c)∧¬P1(c
′)∧ . . .∧¬Pn(c
′) of q′ ensures
that assigning xi to c makes Pi(xi) true, while assigning xi to c
′ makes P (xi) false.
Thus, the assignment of values to the variables x1, . . . , xn acts essentially like a
truth assignment to P1, . . . , Pn.
Straightforward manipulations show that A ⇒ B is valid iff A ∧ ¬B ⇒ false is
valid, and A ∧ ¬B ⇒ false is valid iff ((¬A ⇒ C) ∧ ¬B) ⇒ C is valid, provided
that none of the nonlogical symbols in C appear in A or B. Taking A to be
P1(c) ∧ . . . Pn(c) ∧ ¬P1(c
′) ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Pn(c
′), B to be ∃x1 . . . ∃xnϕ
′, and C to be
¬Permitted(d, d′), where d and d′ are distinct from c and c′, it follows that q is
true iff
∀x1 . . . ∀xn¬ϕ
′ ∧ (¬A⇒ Permitted(d, d′))⇒ Permitted(d, d′) (2)
is valid. The formula ¬A⇒ Permitted(d, d′) is equivalent to
n∧
i=1
¬P1(c)⇒ Permitted(d, d
′) ∧
n∧
i=1
P1(c
′)⇒ Permitted(d, d′)).
Replacing ¬A ⇒ Permitted(d, d′) in (2) by the latter formula gives us a formula
in L2. Thus, we have reduced the truth of a QBF formula to the validity of a
formula in L2, as desired.
For part (c), we prove the NP hardness result by reducing the Hamiltonian path
problem to the validity problem for L4. Let G be an undirected graph, where
V = {v1, . . . , vn} is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. Let Φ be a vocabulary
that includes the constants v1, . . . , vn, a binary predicate Edge, and Permitted.
Finally, let E =
∧
(vi,vj)∈E
Edge(vi, vj), and let
p = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(
∧
i,j≤n;i6=j
(xi 6= xj) ∧
∧
i<n
Edge(xi, xi+1))⇒ Permitted(c, c
′).
It is not hard to show that E ∧ p⇒ Permitted(c, c′) is valid iff there is a Hamil-
tonian path in G. The key observations are (1) there is a Hamiltonian path iff
there is an assignment of distinct domain elements to x1, ..., xn such that there is
an edge between xi and xi+1 for i < n, and (2) there is such an assignment iff
E ∧ p⇒ Permitted(c, c′) is valid.
We prove the co-NP hardness result by reducing the validity problem for propo-
sitional logic to the validity problem for L4. Let g be a propositional formula, let
v1, . . . , vn be the propositions in g, and let g
′ be the first-order formula obtained by
replacing the proposition vi in g with the ground literal R(ci) for i = 1, . . . , n. It is
easy to see that g is valid iff g′ is valid. Because g′ does not include Permitted,
g′ is valid iff g′ ∨ Permitted(c, c′) is valid. Standard manipulations show that
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g′ ∨ Permitted(c, c′) is equivalent to the L4 formula (g
′ ⇒ Permitted(c, c′)) ⇒
Permitted(c, c′).
B. PROOFS FOR SECTION 4
To prove the theorems in Section 4, we need to extend resolution slightly using
techniques of paramodulation [Robinson and Wos 1983]. Note that if c is the clause
∀x1 . . . xn(c
′ ∨ tc = t
′
c), d is the clause ∀y1 . . . ∀ymd
′, td is a term in d
′, and σ is a
substitution such that σ(tc) = σ(td), then the following formula is valid:
c ∧ d⇒ ∀x1 . . . ∀xn∀y1 . . .∀ym(c
′ ∨ d′[td/t
′
c])σ. (3)
A set of clauses is said to be closed under paramodulation if it contains the right-
hand side of (3) whenever it contains the clauses on the left-hand side. Let RP (f)
be the set of clauses obtained by closing f under resolution and paramodulation.
In other words, RP (f) is the smallest set of clauses that includes the conjuncts of
f (when f is in CNF) and, if we can infer a clause d from two clauses c and c′ in
RP (f) by using either resolution or paramodulation, then d is in RP (f).
Theorem B.1. [Brand 1975] If f is a formula in CNF one of whose conjuncts
is ∀x(x = x), then f is satisfiable if and only if RP (f) does not include false.
We remark that the clause ∀(x = x) is needed here, although it is valid. For
example, it is easy to check that RP (∀x(x 6= x)) does not include false , even
though ∀x(x 6= x) is not satisfiable. On the other hand, RP (∀(x 6= x) ∧ ∀(x = x))
clearly includes false .
Corollary B.2. Let f be a CNF formula, none of whose clauses mentions a
disjunct of the form t = t′. Then f is satisfiable iff R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) does not
include false.
Proof. Clearly f is satisfiable iff f ∧ ∀x(x = x) is satisfiable. Let g = f ∧
∀x(x = x). By Theorem B.1, it suffices to show that RP (g) = R(g). Clearly,
R(g) ⊆ RP (g). To show that RP (g) ⊆ R(g), it suffices to show that R(g) is closed
under paramodulation. It is not hard to see that, because no clause in f mentions
a disjunct of the form t = t′, no clause in R(g)− {∀x(x = x)} mentions a disjunct
of the form t = t′. Therefore, applying paramodulation does not lead to any new
clauses.
The next four lemmas relate the closures of various formulas and give bounds
on the complexity of computing the closure. In these proofs, it is convenient to
associate a clause c with its set of disjuncts, which we denote as S(c). For example,
if ℓ1, . . . , ℓk are literals, then S(ℓ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ℓk) = {ℓ1, . . . , ℓk}. For the next four
lemmas, let S = {s 6= s | s is a term}.
Lemma B.3. Let c be a clause with no bipolar literals and let f be a conjunction
of ground literals. If a clause c′ is in R(c∧f∧∀x(x = x)), then c′ is in R(f∧∀x(x =
x)) or S(c′) ⊆ S(cσ) ⊆ S(c′) ∪ S(¬f) ∪ S for some substitution σ.
Proof. Let R′(c ∧ f) consist of the clauses in R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) and all clauses
c′ such that, for some substitution σ, S(c′) ⊆ S(cσ) ⊆ S(c′) ∪ S(¬f) ∪ S. We
want to show that R(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) ⊆ R′(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)). Because
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every conjunct of c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x) is in R′(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)), it suffices to
show that R′(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) is closed under resolution. To do this, suppose
that c1 and c2 are clauses in R
′(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) that resolve on a literal ℓ
to create the resolvent c3. We want to show that c3 ∈ R
′(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)).
If both c1 and c2 are in R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)), then c3 is in R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)), so
c3 ∈ R
′(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)). If exactly one of the clauses is in R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)),
then assume without loss of generality that it is c1. Because f ∧ ∀x(x = x) is
a conjunction of literals, every clause in R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) is either a conjunct
of f ∧ ∀x(x = x) or false; c1 is the parent of a resolvent, so it is a conjunct of
f ∧ ∀x(x = x). Since c2 ∈ R
′(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)) − R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)), there is a
substitution σ such that S(c2) ⊆ S(cσ) ⊆ S(c2) ∪ S(¬f) ∪ S. Since c1 and c2 are
the parents of the resolvent c3 and c1 is a conjunct of f ∧ ∀x(x = x), there is a
substitution σ′ such that c2σ
′ is c3∨ ∼c1, where ∼c1 is the negation of a conjunct
of f or has the form s 6= s. Because S(c2) ⊆ S(cσ), it follows that S(c3) ⊆ S(cσσ
′).
Moreover,
S(cσσ′) ⊆ S(c2σ
′)∪S(¬fσ′)∪S = S(c3)∪{∼c1}∪S(¬f)∪S = S(c3)∪S(¬f)∪S,
since {(s 6= s)σ′|s is a term} ⊆ S, ¬fσ′ = ¬f (because f mentions no variables),
and ∼c1 is either a conjunct of ¬f or a literal in S. So c3 ∈ R
′(c ∧ f ∧ ∀x(x = x)).
Finally, if neither c1 nor c2 is in R(f ∧ ∀x(x = x)), then it is not hard to see that
there are substitutions σ and σ′ such that ℓ is a disjunct of cσ and ¬ℓ is a disjunct
of cσ′, contradicting the assumption that c has no bipolar literals.
For the next three lemmas, let f = E0 ∧ ∀x(x = x) ∧ ¬Permitted(t, t
′) and let
f ′ = E1 ∧ P , where t and t
′ are closed terms.
Lemma B.4. R(f ′ ∧ f) =
⋃
c∈R(f ′)R(c ∧ f).
Proof. Let c be a clause in R(f ′). Because every conjunct of c∧f is in R(f ′∧f)
and R(f ′ ∧ f) is closed under resolution, R(c ∧ f) ⊆ R(f ′ ∧ f). It follows that⋃
c∈R(f ′)R(c ∧ f) ⊆ R(f
′ ∧ f).
For the opposite inclusion, note that every conjunct ofR(f ′∧f) is in
⋃
c∈R(f ′)R(c∧
f). So, it suffices to show that
⋃
c∈R(f ′)R(c ∧ f) is closed under resolution. To do
this, suppose that c1, c2 ∈ R(f
′) and that e is a resolvent with parents d1 ∈ R(c1∧f)
and d2 ∈ R(c2∧f). It suffices to show that e ∈
⋃
c∈R(f ′)R(c∧f). If d1 ∈ R(f), then
clearly d1 ∈ R(c2 ∧ f), so e ∈ R(c2 ∧ f) and we are done. Similarly, if d2 ∈ R(f),
then e ∈ R(c1∧f). Suppose that neither d1 nor d2 is in R(f). Then it follows from
Lemma B.3 that there are substitutions σ1 and σ2 such that c1σ1 = d1 ∨ d
′
1 and
c2σ2 = d2 ∨ d
′
2, where S(d
′
1) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S and S(d
′
2) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S. Because d1 and
d2 are the parents of e, there are substitutions σ
′
1 and σ
′
2, clauses d
′′
1 and d
′′
2 , and
a literal ℓ such that e = d′′1 ∨ d
′′
2 , d1σ
′
1 = d
′′
1 ∨ ℓ, and d2σ
′
2 = d
′′
2 ∨ ¬ℓ. Putting the
pieces together,
c1σ1σ
′
1 = d
′′
1 ∨ ℓ ∨ d
′
1σ
′
1 and c2σ2σ
′
2 = d
′′
2 ∨ ¬ℓ ∨ d
′
2σ
′
2.
(Note that S(d′1σ
′
1) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S and S(d
′
2σ
′
2) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S, because the only
variables that appear in d′1 or d
′
2 are in disjuncts of the form t 6= t.) Clearly c1 and
c2 resolve to create a resolvent e
′ ∈ R(f ′). Moreover, e′σ1σ2 = e ∨ d
′
1σ
′
1 ∨ d
′
2σ
′
2, so
e ∈ R(e′ ∧ f).
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Lemma B.5. If every clause in f ′ has at most one literal that is bipolar in f ′,
then R(f ′) has O(|f ′|2) clauses, each of length at most 2Lf ′L
′
f ′ , and R(f
′) can
computed in time O(|f ′|2).
Proof. Note that the resolvent e of two clauses in f ′ has no bipolars, because
every clause in f ′ has at most one bipolar. It follows that e is not a parent of a
resolvent in R(f ′). So,
R(f ′) = {c | c is in S(f ′) or is the resolvent of two clauses in S(f ′)}.
Thus, R(f ′) has O(|f ′|2) clauses and each clause has length less than 2Lf ′L
′
f ′ . To
find R(f ′), we simply check each pair of clauses c and c′ in f ′ to see if there is a
literal on which they resolve; if so, we resolve them. The check can be done in time
O(|c||c′|); the resolution can be done in time O(|c| + |c′|). Since, by assumption,
each clause contains at most one instance of a bipolar literal, there will be at most
one resolvent for each pair of clauses. It easily follows that R(f ′) can be computed
in time O(|f ′|2).
If C is a set of clauses, let ‖C‖ =
∑
c∈C |c|. For all predicate symbolsQ, a variable
v is Q-constrained in a clause c if v appears as an argument to Q in c. Note that
a constrained variable, as defined in Section 4.1, is Permitted-constrained.
Lemma B.6. Suppose that f mentions m terms and C is a non-empty set of
clauses such that, for every c ∈ C, no literal in c is bipolar in c. Then
(a) false ∈
⋃
c∈C R(c ∧ f) iff (i) false ∈ R(f) or (ii) there is a clause c ∈ C and a
substitution σ such that S(cσ) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S;
(b) we can determine whether (i) holds in time O(|E0| log |E0|);
(c) we can determine whether (ii) holds in time O((|E0|+R‖C‖|Permitted(t, t
′)|) log |E0|),
where R = m if every literal in every clause c in C mentions at most one variable
that is not constrained in c; otherwise R = mk, where every clause c in C has at
most k variables that are not constrained in c.
Proof. For part (a), the “only if” direction follows immediately from Lemma B.3.
For the “if” direction, it is easy to see that R(f) ⊆ R(c∧ f) for every clause c ∈ C.
So, if false ∈ R(f), then false ∈
⋃
c∈C R(c ∧ f). Also, if there is a clause c ∈ C
and a substitution σ such that S(cσ) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S, then it readily follows from the
definition of resolution that false ∈ R(c ∧ f), so false ∈
⋃
c∈C R(c ∧ f).
For part (b), because f is a conjunction of literals, it is easy to see that false ∈
R(f) iff (1) E0 includes a literal of the form t 6= t or (2) E0 includes a literal and
its negation. Clearly, we can check whether (1) holds in time O(|E0|). To check
whether (2) holds, we use a splay tree [Sleator and Tarjan 1983], a form of binary
search tree for which, starting with an empty tree, K insertions and S searches
take time O((K + S) logK). Specifically, we insert every negative literal in E0
into the empty splay tree T . Then, for every positive literal ℓ in E0, we search T
for ¬ℓ. Since at most |E0| insertion and |E0| search operations are involved, time
O(|E0| log |E0|) is required.
For part (c), recall that f = E0 ∧ ∀x(x = x) ∧ ¬Permitted(t, t
′). For any
clause c, let cE and cP be clauses such that c = cE ∨ cP , cE is Permitted-free,
and every disjunct in cP mentions Permitted. Because E0 is Permitted-free,
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S(cσ) ⊆ S(¬f) ∪ S iff S(cEσ) ⊆ S(¬E0) ∪ S and S(cPσ) ⊆ {Permitted(t, t
′)}. It
follows that we can find a substitution σ such that S(cσ) ⊆ S(¬f)∪S, if one exists,
by finding substitutions σ′ and σ′′ such that S(cPσ
′) ⊆ {Permitted(t, t′)} and
S(cEσ
′σ′′) ⊆ S(¬E0) ∪ S, and taking σ = σ
′ ◦ σ′′ We can assume without loss of
generality that σ(x) = x for every variable x that does not appear in c. Thus, we can
clearly check if an appropriate substiuttion σ exists in time O(|c||Permitted(t, t′)|),
by pattern-matching each occurrence of Permitted in cP with Permitted(t, t
′).
Moreover, if σ exists, then |cσ| ≤ |c||Permitted(t, t′)|, since σ substitutes terms in
Permitted(t, t′) for variables in cP .
Let
D = {d : there is a clause c ∈ C and a substitution σ such that σ(x) = x if x
does not appear in c, S(cPσ) ⊆ {Permitted(t, t
′)}, and d = cEσ}.
We can clearly construct D in time O(‖C‖|Permitted(t, t′)|), by considering the
clauses in C one at a time, and ‖D‖ < ‖C‖|Permitted(t, t′)|. Thus, to complete
the proof of part (c), it suffices to show that we can determine whether there is
a d ∈ D and a substitution σ such that S(dσ) ⊆ S(¬E0) ∪ S in time O((|E0| +
R‖D‖) log |E0|), where R is as defined in the lemma. We can do this by a brute-
force search. In more detail, we insert every literal in E0 into an empty splay tree
T ; then, for each clause d ∈ D and each possible assignment σ of terms in E0 to
variables in d, we check whether every literal in dσ is the negation of a literal in T
or is of the form t 6= t. Suppose every clause c in C has at most k variables that
are not constrained in c. Then d has at most k variables. Since E0 mentions at
most m terms, it follows that there are at most mk ways of assigning terms in E0 to
variables in d. As we have observed, the O(|E0|) insertions and O(m
k|d|) searches
can be done in time O((|E0|+m
k|d|) log |E0|). For each literal ℓ in S(dσ)−S(¬E),
we can determine whether ℓ is of the form t = t in time O(|ℓ|). Thus, the time
needed to check every clause d ∈ D is O((|E0|+m
k‖D‖) log |E0|).
We may be able to do better if every literal in every clause c in C has at most
one variable that is not constrained in c. In this case, every literal in every clause
d in D has at most one variable. It follows that, given a clause d ∈ D, we can
partition the literals in d into sets according to their variable. That is, in time
O(|d|), we can write d as d1 ∨ . . . ∨ dk, where two literals ℓ and ℓ
′ mention the
same variable iff ℓ and ℓ′ both appear in di for i = 1, . . . , k. Clearly, there is a
substitution σ such that S(dσ) ⊆ S(¬E0) ∪ S iff there are substitutions σ1, . . . , σk
such that S(diσi) ⊆ S(¬E0) ∪ S, for i = 1, . . . , k. For a particular di, there are
at most m possible substitutions of terms in E0 to the variable in di. So, given
a splay tree T whose entries are the conjuncts in E0, we can determine if there is
an appropriate σi in time O(m|di| log |E0|). Thus, given T , we can determine if
there are appropriate substitutions σ1, . . . , σk in time O(m|d| log |E0|). Since we
can construct T in time O(|E0| log |E0|), the total time needed for a particular
clause d ∈ D is O((|E0|+m|d|) log |E0|), and the time needed to check every d ∈ D
is O((|E0|+m‖D‖) log |E0|).
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that E ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is a standard query
in which E is basic, the equality symbol is not mentioned in E ∧ P , and there are
no bipolars in P . Then E ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is valid iff there is a conjunct p
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of P such that E ∧ p⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is valid.
Proof. Here and elsewhere, let E+ be an abbreviation for ∀x(x = x) ∧ E. By
Corollary B.2, it suffices to show that R(E+∧P ∧¬Permitted(t, t′)) includes false
iff R(E+∧p∧¬Permitted(t, t′)) includes false for some conjunct p of P . It follows
from Lemma B.4, where we take f to be E+ ∧ ¬Permitted(t, t′) and f ′ to be P ,
that R(E+∧P ∧¬Permitted(t, t′)) includes false iff R(E+∧c∧¬Permitted(t, t′))
includes false for some c in R(P ). Since there are no bipolar literals in P , R(P ) is
just the set of conjuncts in P , so we are done.
Theorem 4.1. Let L5 consist of all standard queries of the form E ∧ P ⇒
Permitted(t, t′) such that
(1) E is basic (i.e., E is a conjunction of ground literals),
(2) there are no bipolar literals in P ,
(3) equality is not mentioned in E ∧ P , and
(4) every variable appearing in a conjunct p of P is constrained in p.
We can determine the validity of formulas in L5 in time O((|E|+|P ||Permitted(t, t
′)|) log |E|),
where |ϕ| denotes the length of ϕ, when viewed as a string of symbols.
Proof. Let Sp be the set of conjuncts of P . By Proposition 4.2, E ∧ P ⇒
Permitted(t, t′) is valid iff E ∧ p ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) is valid, for some conjunct
p of P . By Corollary B.2, the latter statement holds iff false ∈
⋃
p∈Sp
R(E+ ∧ p ∧
¬Permitted(t, t′)). It follows from Lemma B.6(a), where we take C = Sp and
f = E+ ∧¬Permitted(t, t′), that false ∈
⋃
p∈Sp
R(E+ ∧ p∧¬Permitted(t, t′)) iff
(a) false is in R(E+∧¬Permitted(t, t′)) or (b) there is a clause p ∈ Sp and a substi-
tution σ such that S(pσ) ⊆ S(¬E+ ∨Permitted(t, t′)) ∪ {s 6= s | s is a term}. By
Lemma B.6(b), we can determine whether (a) holds in time O(|E| log |E|). It follows
from Lemma B.6(c), where f = E+∧¬Permitted(t, t′), C = Sp, and k = 0, that we
can determine whether (b) holds in time O((|E|+|P ||Permitted(t, t′)|) log |E|).
Rather than just proving Theorem 4.5, we prove a slightly stronger result, from
which we will also be able to prove Theorem 5.1. Note that part (b) of the following
theorem is equivalent to Theorem 4.5.
Theorem B.7. Suppose that E is a standard environment, P is a conjunction
of pure permitting policies, and D is a conjunction of (not necessarily pure) denying
policies such that, for every resolvent f created by resolving a conjunct of P and
a conjunct of D on a literal that mentions Permitted, either E ⇒ f is valid or
q ⇒ f is valid for some conjunct q of P ∧D. Then
(a) E ∧ P is consistent iff E ∧ P ∧D is consistent
(b) E ∧ P ∧ ¬Permitted(t, t′) is consistent iff E ∧ P ∧D ∧ ¬Permitted(t, t′) is
consistent, where t and t′ are terms of the appropriate sort.
Proof. We prove part (a) here; the proof of part (b) is identical.
Suppose that the hypotheses of the theorem hold. Since g = E ∧
∧
p∈P p is
consistent, it has a Herbrand model , that is, a model whose domain consists of all
the variable-free terms in the language. Of the Herbrand models for g, let m be a
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minimally permissive one, that is, one for which the extension of the Permitted
predicate is minimal. We claim that in fact m |= E∧
∧
p∈P p∧
∧
d∈D d. For suppose
not. Then there is a denying policy ∀x1 . . .∀xnd in D and a variable substitution
σd such that:
(1) m |= ¬dσd and
(2) for all denying policies ∀x1 . . . ∀xne ∈ D and variable substitution σe such that
m |= ¬eσe, the number of negative literals in eσe that mention Permitted is at
least the number of negative literals in dσd that mention Permitted. (Note that
we are assuming all policies are in CNF, so that the number of negative literals
in a policy is well-defined.)
Since d is a denying policy, dσd has at least one negated Permitted formula among
its clauses; that is dσd = d
′ ∨ ¬Permitted(sd, s
′
d) for some terms sd and s
′
d. Since
m |= ¬dσd, we have that m |= ¬d
′ ∧ Permitted(sd, s
′
d). Since m is minimally
permissive, there must be a pure permitting policy ∀x1 . . .∀xnp ∈ P and a variable
substitution σp such that pσp = p
′ ∨Permitted(sd, s
′
d) and m |= ¬p
′. (Otherwise,
consider the model obtained by removing (sd, s
′
d) from the extension of Permitted;
it must also satisfy g, and is less permissive than m.) Let f = p′∨d′ be the formula
created by resolving pσp and dσd on Permitted(sd, s
′
d). Note that, by choice of
p′ and d′, m |= ¬f . It follows from the definition of resolution and the fact that p
is a pure permitting policy that the number of negative literals in f that mention
Permitted is less than the number of such literals in dσd. Moreover, by hypothesis,
either E ⇒ f is valid or q ⇒ f is valid for some q ∈ P ∪ D. Since m |= E ∧ ¬f ,
E ⇒ f is not valid, so q ⇒ f is valid for some q ∈ P ∪D. Since m |= ¬f , m |= ¬q;
and, since m |=
∧
p∈P p by assumption, q ∈ D. Therefore, there is a denying policy
∀x1 . . .∀xne ∈ D such that ∀x1 . . .∀xne ⇒ f is valid. It is not hard to show that
∀x1 . . .∀xne ⇒ f is valid iff there is a variable substitution σe such that eσe = f .
Thus, ∀x1 . . . ∀xne is a denying policy in D and σe is a variable substitution such
that m |= ¬eσe (because m |= ¬f). The number of negative literals in eσe that
mention Permitted (which is the number of negative literals in f that mention
Permitted) is less than the number of such literals in dσd. Thus, we have a
contradiction.
Proposition 4.6. If q is an equality-safe standard query, then there is a stan-
dard query q′ of the form E′0 ∧E
′
1 ∧ P
′ ⇒ Permitted(t, t′) such that (a) q is valid
iff q′ is valid, (b) q′ is equation-free, and (c) |q′| = O(|q||L′q), where L
′
q is the length
of the longest term in q. Moreover, we can find such a q′ in time O(|q|).
Proof. Suppose that q has the form F0 ∧ F1 ∧ E1 ∧ P ⇒ Permitted(s, s
′),
where F0 is the conjunction of the equality statements, while F1 consists of the
remaining conjuncts in E0. To create q
′, we partition the set of terms in E0 into
equivalence classes; terms te and t
′
e are in the same class if the equality formulas
in E0 imply te = t
′
e. The equivalence classes can be found in linear time.
4 Since q
4In general, the problem of constructing equivalence classes is harder than linear time. For
example, if c1 = c2, then f(c1) = f(c2). However, we do not have to worry about drawing such
inferences—if E0 ⇒ (c1 = c2) is valid, then it cannot be the case that f(c1) and f(c2) are both
terms in E0, for then E0 ⇒ (f(c1) = f(c2)) is valid, and q would not be equality-safe.
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is equality-safe, each equivalence class has at most one term that is not a constant.
If an equivalence class has a term that is not a constant, then we choose that
term to represent the class; otherwise, we select a representative arbitrarily. Let
q′ = F ′1 ∧E
′
1 ∧ P
′ ⇒ Permitted(t, t′), where F ′1, E
′
1, P
′, t, and t′ are the result of
replacing each closed term in F1, E1, P , s, and s
′, respectively, that also appears in
F0 by its representative. It suffices to show that q is valid if and only if q
′ is valid,
because the other statements in the conclusion of Proposition 4.6 follow immediately
from the construction of q′. Let q′′ = F0 ∧ F
′
1 ∧ E
′
1 ∧ P
′ ⇒ Permitted(t, t′). It is
easy to see that q is equivalent to q′′; substituting a term by its representative in
the equivalence class is justified in the presence of F0. Thus, it suffices to show that
q′′ is valid iff q′ is valid. The “if” direction is trivial. For the “only if” direction,
suppose by way of contradiction that q′′ is valid and q′ is not. It follows that there
is a model m with interpretation I that does not satisfy q′. Let m′ be a model that
is identical to m except that m′ interprets a constant r as I(r′) if r and r′ are in
the same equivalence class and r′ is the class representative. Clearly, m′ satisfies
F0. Moreover, because m does not satisfy q
′ and the only difference between m
and m′ is the interpretation of constants that are not mentioned in q′, m′ does not
satisfy q′. This contradicts the validity of q′.
The following example illustrates the procedure for creating q′ from q.
Example B.8. Consider the query “may Bob nap”, given that Alice is Bob’s
wife, Alice may nap, and any individual may nap if his wife may nap. We can
write the query as q = e ∧ p1 ∧ p2 ⇒ Permitted(Bob,nap), where
e = (Alice = wifeOf(Bob)),
p1 = Permitted(Alice,nap), and
p2 = ∀x(Permitted(wifeOf(x),nap)⇒ Permitted(x,nap)).
The query q′ is the result of removing the conjunct e from q and replacing every oc-
currence of Alice by wifeOf(Bob). Thus, q′ = p′1∧p
′
2 ⇒ Permitted(Bob,nap),
where
p′1 = Permitted(wifeOf(Bob),nap) and
p′2 = ∀x(Permitted(wifeOf(x),nap)⇒ Permitted(x,nap)).
Note that we replace Alice by wifeOf(Bob) because the two terms are in the same
equivalence class and, since wifeOf(Bob) mentions a function symbol, it is the
class representative. Also note that if we replace wifeOf(Bob) by Alice, then the
resulting query is not valid, even though q is. In general, we do not preserve validity
if we replace a term that includes a function symbol. That is why we restrict to
equality-safe queries in Proposition 4.6.
Theorem 4.7. The validity of an equation-free Lithium query q = E0∧E1∧P ⇒
Permitted(t, t′) with m terms in E0 can be determined in time O((|E0|+ T |E1 ∧
P |2) log |E0|), where T = mLE1∧PL
′
E1∧P
|Permitted(t, t′)| if every literal in every
conjunct c of E1 ∧ P mentions at most one variable that is not constrained in
c relative to q; otherwise, T = m2kLE1∧PL
′
E1∧P
|Permitted(t, t′)|, where every
conjunct c of E1 ∧ P has at most k variables that are not constrained in c relative
to q.
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Proof. By Corollary B.2, q is valid iffR(E0∧∀x(x = x)∧E1∧P∧¬Permitted(t, t
′))
includes false. Let E+0 be E0 ∧ ∀x(x = x) and let q
+ be the result of replacing
E0 in the antecedent of q by E
+
0 . By Lemma B.4, false ∈ R(¬q
+) iff there is
a clause c ∈ R(E1 ∧ P ) such that false ∈ R(c ∧ E
+
0 ∧ ¬Permitted(t, t
′)). By
Lemma B.6(a), the latter statement holds iff (1) false ∈ R(E+0 ∧¬Permitted(t, t
′))
or (2) there is a clause c ∈ R(E1 ∧ P ) and a substitution σ such that S(cσ) ⊆
S(¬E+0 ∨ Permitted(t, t
′)) ∪ {s 6= s | s is a term}. By Lemma B.6(b), we can
check whether (1) holds in time O(|E0| log |E0|). To determine whether (2) holds,
we first note that, by Lemma B.5, we can compute R(E1 ∧ P ) in time O(|E1 ∧
P |2). Once we have R(E1 ∧ P ), it follows from Lemma B.6(c), where we take
C = R(E1 ∧ P ), that we can determine whether (2) holds in time O((|E0| +
mk
′
|R(E1 ∧ P )||Permitted(t, t
′)|) log |E0|) if every clause c ∈ R(E1 ∧ P ) has
at most k′ variables that are not constrained in c. It follows from Lemma B.5
that |R(E1 ∧ P )| is O(|E1 ∧ P |
2LE1∧PL
′
E1∧P
); it follows from the way resolu-
tion is defined that k′ ≤ 2k. So, we can determine whether (2) holds in time
O((|E0|+m
2k|E1 ∧ P |
2LE1∧PL
′
E1∧P
|Permitted(t, t′)|) log |E0|).
Suppose that every literal in every conjunct c of E1 ∧ P mentions at most one
variable that is not constrained in c relative to q. Then it follows from the definition
of resolution that every literal ℓ in every clause c in R(E1∧P ) mentions at most one
variable that is not constrained in c. It follows from Lemma B.6(c), where we again
take C = R(E1 ∧ P ), that we can determine whether (2) holds in this case in time
O((|E0|+m|R(E1∧P )||Permitted(t, t
′)|) log |E0|), once we have computed R(E1∧
P ). By Lemma B.5, we can compute R(E1∧P ) in time O(|E1∧P |
2) and |R(E1∧P )|
is O(|E1 ∧ P |
2LE1∧PL
′
E1∧P
). So, the total time needed to determine whether (2)
holds is O((|E0|+m|E1 ∧ P |
2LE1∧PL
′
E1∧P
|Permitted(t, t′)|) log |E0|).
C. PROOFS FOR SECTION 5
Theorem 5.1. Suppose that E is an environment, P is a conjunction of pure
permitting policies, and D is a conjunction of (not necessarily pure) denying policies
such that the antecedent of Theorem 4.5 holds. Then E ∧ P ∧D is satisfiable iff E
is satisfiable.
Proof. If E is satisfiable, then E∧P satisfiable. (For any model m that satisfies
E there is a model m′ that is identical to m, except m′ satisfies Permitted(s, s′)
for all terms s and s′ of the appropriate sort; m′ satisfies E ∧P .) The result is now
immediate from Theorem B.7(a).
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